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ARTICLES
INTEGRATING THOUGHTWAYS: RE-OPENING OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MIND?
LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY*
The implementation of environmental law and policy has assumed that pollu-
tion could be contained, corralled and interdicted within the medium (air, land, or
water) in which unpleasant effects are encountered. Sweeping, but piecemeal, federal
legislation in the 1970s aspired to create healthy air, together with fishable, swim-
mable and drinkable waters. Despite impressive gains, these goals have not been
achieved. There have been painful failures, compounded by the mounting costs of
environmental protection. While the need for environmental protection is generally
accepted, the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation based on the legislation of the
1970s has been questioned in the 1980s.
This Article argues that the twin goals of efficiency and effectiveness could be
satisfied by adopting an integrated approach to pollution control. It is fundamental
to such an approach that the effects of pollution should be pursued to their sources,
and that air, land and water be considered as one environment rather than as separate
and discrete parts. Professor Guruswamy develops his argument by tracing the legis-
lative history of two epochal environmental events: the enactment of the Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts of the 1970s and the establishment of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA). He points out how the integrative thrust behind the EPA
floundered amidst a climate of opinion hostile to New Deal expertise, legislative turf
battles and administrative jealousies. Maintaining that integration is an idea whose
time has come, Professor Guruswamy nevertheless contends that new comprehensive
environmental legislation will face insuperable obstacles. Arguing for an administra-
tive solution, he relies on evolving concepts of environmental policy, and compara-
tive examples abroad, to recall EPA to its original mandate of integration. Finally,
Professor Guruswamy analyzes the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to demon-
strate the considerable extent to which an integrated approach, based on TSCA,
could be implemented by the EPA.
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THE HYDRA-HEADED OGRE
This is a fable' about the hydra-headed ogre of pollution
(the Hydra). Having found its way into the United States, it
I. This allegory is derived from sources cited throughout the Article. In the United
States, the main thrust towards a cross-media approach to pollution control has come from the
Conservation Foundation. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, CONTROLLING CROSS-MEDIA POLLU-
TANTS (1984) [hereinafter CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS]; CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, NEW PER-
SPECTIVES ON POLLUTION CONTROL: CROSS-MEDIA PROBLEMS (1985); CONSERVATION FOUNDATION,
STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT MID-DECADE (1984) [hereinafter NEW PERSPEC-
TIVES]; B. RABE, FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
(1986). The National Research Council and National Academy of Public Administration, after
studying the subject have lent their weighty support to the adoption of an integrated approach to
pollution control. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MULTIMEDIA APPROACHES TO POLLUTION
CONTROL: A SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS (1987); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION,
STEPs TOWARD A STABLE FUTURE (1986). In the United Kingdom, the Royal Commission on Envi-
ronmental Pollution (RCEP) has taken the lead in advocating an integrated approach. See ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAI POLLUTION, BEST PRACTICABLE ENVIRONMENTAL OPTION (Rep.
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began its predations about the middle of the twentieth century.
It did so invisibly, often deviously, so that most people did not
realize what it was doing and, therefore, did little to stop it.2
Left virtually unmolested for nearly two decades, it grew worse,
feasting on the surrounding environment and people. The Hydra
became quite bold in its attacks in the air, water and land, show-
ing different heads at different places.' The people felt threat-
ened and called on Congress and the President for help. They
were given laws dealing with air pollution,4 water pollution' and
No. 12, 1988) [hereinafter RCEP, No. 12]; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION,
MANAGING WASTE: THE DUTY OF CARE (Rep. No. 11, 1985) [hereinafter RCEP, No. 11]; ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION, TACKLING POLLUTION-EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS
(Rep. No. 10, 1984) [hereinafter RCEP, No. 10]; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLLU-
TION, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH (Rep. No. 5, 1976) [hereinafter
RCEP, No. 5]. See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF
THE ENVIRONMENT (1985). Two further publications-DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (UNITED
KINGDOM), INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL (1988) and CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT (Second Draft, 1988)-have arrived too late to be considered except
in a very impressionistic manner.
2. Prior to 1948, there was little federal legislation dealing with environmental pollu-
tion. Environmental control was traditionally viewed as protecting the health, safety and welfare
of the people and, therefore, was a function of the states under their police powers. F. GRAD, G.
RATHJENS & A. ROSENTHAL, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL: POLICIES AND THE LAW 49 (1971); R. MEL-
NICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 25 (1983). There were
exceptions, such as the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, but they were rarely ap-
plied until the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rediscovered them in 1971. See infra note
5.
3. In the early 1960s, there were shocking reports about pollution headlined in
Redbook, Sports Illustrated and Life Magazine. For example, thousands of fish killed in the Passaic
River in 1960; aotemperature inversion (an unusual meteorological occurrence in which a layer of
warmer air overlies a heavier, cooler layer that holds down pollution) in New York in 1966 that
resulted in 80 deaths; and the oil spills on the York River, Cape Cod and Wake Island in 1967. The
history of such incidents is recounted in J. PETULA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES 39-61 (1987).
4. The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206,77 Stat. 392 (1963); Motor Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272,79 Stat. 992 (1965); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). The agency responsible for implementation was the National Air Pollu-
tion Control Administration in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).
5. Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948); Water Qual-
ity Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965); Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966); Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970). The 1965 act created the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration
within the Department of the Interior; this agency was to oversee the adoption and implementa-
tion of water quality standards. See Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water
Quality, 52 IOWA L. REV. 186 (1966); Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of the
Federal Water Quality Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1970). At the same time, section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899), was revived to prevent the discharge of polluting wastes. The history of
how this act was developed is recounted in 2 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER
162-80 (1986).
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solid waste pollution.6 In addition, corresponding agencies were
provided to fight the ogre. The laws and agencies proved to be no
match for the Hydra.7 It continued to feast on the environment
and people, expanding to fiendish proportions. Then, having
grown so powerful, and too massive to remain hidden, it spurned
its hiding places and openly terrorized the peope on land and in
the air and water.8
The people had, by now, become truly terrified. They
poured out into the streets and packed meetings on Earth Day,
imploring Congress and the President to end the tyranny.9 Pub-
lic outrage at the extent of pollution resulted in incessant calls
for action against the Hydra. 0 The nation had become engaged
in a crusade. "
The crusade, however, was conducted in disunity. Disunity
was manifested between the President and Congress, within
congressional subcommittees, and between the President and
6. Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965). This act autho-
rized research and grant programs, and led to the creation of the Bureau of Solid Waste Manage-
ment in HEW. The Resource Recovery Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970),
amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
7. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 210-11 (1977); Schoenbrod,
Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 744-45
(1983). See also R. MELNICK, supra note 2, at 28; R. TOBIN, THE SOCIAL GAMBLE: DETERMINING
ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF AIR QUALITY 71-75 (1979); J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLU-
TION 26-57 (1975).
8. In 1969, the Cuyahoga River burst into flames. In the same year, over 800 miles of
ocean were despoiled by the Santa Barbara oil spill. The problem of smog in Los Angeles increased
dramatically. The water supply of many midwestern cities was found to be polluted with excessive
nitrates. It was feared that Lake Erie was dying. See B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 1-11
(1971). In 1976, Newsweek implicated environmental pollutants as a cause of cancer. There were
hundreds of reports in newspapers and on prime time television showing public outcries over
environmental pollution in its various forms. In 1978, heavy media coverage was given to the
devastating effect of chemicals seeping into homes around Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New
York. An account of these events is found in J. PETULA, supra note 3, at 57-61.
9. Earth Day was held on April 22, 1970, and millions participated. The New York
Times proclaimed: "Millions Join Earth Day Observances across the Nation." N.Y. Times, Apr.
23, 1970, at 1, col. 3. Astonished accounts of the extent and feeling of the meetings and demonstra-
tions were reported in all the media. For a summary of the nationwide reporting of these activities
and their impact, even on conservative politicians and observers, see J. WHITAKER, STRIKING A
BALANCE 2-16 (1976).
10. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, PROTECTING THE ENVI-
RONMENT: POLITICS, POLLUTION AND FEDERAL POLICY 18 (1981) [hereinafter ACIR, PROTECTING
THE ENVIRONMENT]; see also Erskine, The Polls: Pollution and Its Cost, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 120
(1972) (noting the remarkable speed with which.environmental consciousness sprang, as it were,
from "nowhere" to major proportions in a few years). Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Envi-
ronmental Control, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 231, 233-34 (1970) ("Until recently there has been no
organized pressure for environmental control. The political situation has changed radically. Every
politician is now sounding the call for pure air and pure water. The legislative activity is tremen-
dous."); R. MELNICK, supra note 2, at 28; C. JONES, CLEAN AIR 137-55 (1975).
i1. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implemen-
tation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1217 (1977).
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EPA.12 Moreover, the crusaders were unaware or uncertain
about how to kill the Hydra. Those whom the air Hydra
threatened were so concerned-with air pollution damage that
they overlooked the devastation the Hydra caused in the water
or on the land. Accordingly, they focused on efforts to slay the
air Hydra and were given new laws directed at destroying air
pollution. 3 Others, who encountered the Hydra on water,
found it so horrifying that they, too, developed tunnel vision and
ignored what the Hydra was doing in the air or on the land.
They demanded and were given new water pollution legisla-
tion.14 Those who confronted the Hydra on land did likewise
and were rewarded with new solid waste disposal laws. 5
At one stage, the President thought that a single, inte-
grated agency should conduct a unified battle against the mon-
ster. He established the Great Agency for this purpose. ' 6 The
President and Congress also recognized the need for an inte-
grated campaign against the Hydra by enacting laws dealing
with national environmental policy"7 and toxic waste. 18 Unfor-
tunately, these laws did not put an end to the disunity between
the President and Congress. Furthermore, earlier laws had al-
ready divided the environment into sectors, and bureaucracies
had become accustomed to acting only within defined programs
and the confined jurisdictions of air, water, or land. These bu-
reaucracies felt that the original mission of the Great Agency
and the objectives found in integrating laws were impracticable,
and integration was soon forgotten.' 9
Alas, the attempt to deal with pollution within individual
sectors was not altogether successful. As the saga unfolded, it
became apparent that the felling of one head of the Hydra often
resulted in the appearance of another. The proclaimed decapita-
tion and "elimination" of a single head proved to be an illusion.
12. R. MELNICK, supra note 2, at 31-35.
13. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
14. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972); Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974); Clean Water
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
15. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(1984). Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
16. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970) [hereinafter Reorga-
nization Plan].
17. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190,83 Stat. 852 (1970).
18. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976).
19. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
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Instead of being eliminated or neutralized (by chemical or phys-
ical processes that changed it into a non-pollutant), a pollutant
was simply translerred from one medium to another. Pollution
controllers failed to realize that each head (of pollution) arose
from its source (the Hydra's body or wastes) and that the whole
Hydra constituted the real enemy.
Pollution apparently dispelled from the air did some omi-
nous things. Sometimes it appeared at different and distant
places in a form more fierce than before.20 In other instances,
pollution disappeared from the air only to alight on water21 or,
when interdicted in the air, materialized on land.2 Similarly,
pollution apparently expelledfrom water reemerged in the air or
materialized on land.z3 When the Hydra was prohibited from
20. When sulfur dioxide was sent away from one area, it combined with nitrogen oxides
to cause acid deposition in another. See Martin, Acid Rain From Source to Receptor, 5 CANADA-
U.S. L.J. 16 (1982); Snipes, Acid Rain: Causes, Effects, and Remedies, 3 STAN. ENVTL. L. ANN. 118
(1981); Kramer, Transboundary Air Pollution and the Clean Air Act: An Historical Perspective, 32
U. KAN. L. REv. 181 (1983); 1 NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, INTERIM
ASSESSMENT: THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF ACIDIC DEPOSITION (1987) (executive summary). Sulfur
dioxide, which results from the combustion of coal, tends to settle out of the air close to the point
from which it is emitted. To prevent this, tall stacks were built (usually with high velocities in
them), and sulfur dioxide was emitted into the air from these stacks. It was hoped that sulfur
dioxide would be removed from the point of origin, while the dispersive processes in the atmos-
phere would dilute it below the level of physiological significance. Unforeseen was the extent to
which it could combine with other pollutants to cause acid rain which affects vegetation and land,
as well as water.
21. In the mid-1970s, the fish in Lake George, a popular recreational lake in New York,
had accumulated dangerously high levels of mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). A
significant, though not the sole, cause was deposition from the air. Similarly, deposition from the
air is a major source of pollution in the Great Lakes. In fact, the single largest source of lead, zinc
and copper pollution is not direct discharge into water, but atmospheric deposition. CROSS-MEDIA
POLLUTANTS, supra note 1, at 1, 16-17; Elder, Air Toxics: A Headache for the Great Lakes, 14 EPA
JOURNAL 37 (1988). Once again, the attempt to get rid of air pollution by discharging it into the air
did not take account of the extent to which there was an interface between air and water pollution.
What the atmosphere was unable to disperse came down on land or water.
22. For example, technologies used to comply with air pollution laws may produce from
three to six tons of scrubber sludge for every ton of sulfur dioxide removed from flue gases. About
four fifths of the 118 million tons of dry metric sludge produced annually is the direct result of air
pollution controls mandated for industrial and power plants. CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS, supra
note 1, at 9. A preponderance of this sludge is deposited on land. Another example, from East
Helena, Montana, is quite revealing. Cadmium was controlled by ambient air quality standards in
order to prevent damage to human health caused by inhalation of cadmium. Experts found, how-
ever, that the perceived cause for concern and control (inhalation) was much less damaging than
exposure through the consumption of locally grown food contaminated by air depositions of cad-
mium. The problem was that ambient air quality standards directed at inhalation did not cover
food contaminated by the fall-out of cadmium. There was little appreciation of the total exposure
of a person to cadmium through different pathways. Id. at 2.
23. A recent EPA study of what happened to toxic substances-which include organic
pollutants (such as pesticide solvents, PCBs and dioxins), metals (such as mercury, cadmium, zinc
and copper), and other compounds (such as asbestos and cyanide)-entering a sewage treatment
plant shows that typically only about 50% of toxics are actually removed. Of the remainder, 20%
go into air, 15% are deposited on land in the form of sewage sludge and 15% go back into the
1989:463 Integrating Thoughtways 469
entering the water, it sometimes took different and equally in-
timidating forms.24 The story repeated itself on land.25
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern industrial societies engage in a staggering range of domes-
tic and industrial activities that make high demands on energy and raw
materials. The matter and energy used in these activities are neither
created nor destroyed, but instead merely transformed. Massive quanti-
ties of wastes or residuals are, therefore, the unavoidable by-products
of today's living.26 For example, the residuals generated by even an
ordinary city bus include noise, heat, hydrocarbons, particulates and
carbon monoxide. Residuals arise from the manufacture, processing
and packaging of new products out of raw materials and natural re-
sources undertaken at an iron or steel complex, a motor car plant, or an
water, without treatment. These statistics enable one to understand how a municipal wastewater
treatment plant in Philadelphia is the largest source of air pollution in that metropolitan area.
Letter from J. Clarence Davies, Executive Vice-President of the Conservation Foundation, to Mr
Hank Schilling, Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation of EPA, and Members of the Advisory
Committee (March 13, 1987). This is not an illustration of the inadequacy of treatment works. It
raises the more fundamental question of why these toxics were allowed to enter the sewer in the
first place. Were the effects of these toxics on the entire environment assessed before the decision to
discharge them into water? Although section 307 of the Clean Water Act, dealing with pre-treat-
ment of affluent, goes some way towards recognizing the problem, this section does not offer a
complete solution.
24. In one particular industrial plant, the removal of two tons of pollutants from its
liquid effluent generated 1.9 tons of other forms of pollutants. RCEP, No. 12, supra note 1, 3.10,
at 15.
25. It has been well documented that leaching is a major means by which pollutants
migrate from waste management sites on land into groundwater. V. PVE, R. PATRICK & J.
QUARLES, GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); GEOPHYSICS RESEARCH
FORUM, STUDIES IN GEOPHYSICS: GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION (1984); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, GROUND-WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY (1984); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY, CONTAMINATION OF GROUNDWATER BY TOXIC ORGANIC CHEMICALS (1981). Simi-
larly, volatilization is a process by which pollutants in waste sites can find their way into the air.
CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS, supra note I, at 15-16 (citing COMMITTEE TO REVIEW METHODS OF
ECOTOXICOLOGY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TESTING FOR EFFECTS OF CHEMICALS ON ECOSYS-
TEMS 1618 (1981)). Not surprisingly, a study of 27 out of 200 chemicals found in Love Canal (a
notorious abandoned waste dump) showed that 18 of the 27 pollutants were found in air, water
and soil. An assessment of case histories at a variety of other waste sites showed that 32% of the
pollutants found affected groundwater, 31% soil, 29% surface water, and 8% air. CROSS-MEDIA
POLLUTANTS, supra note I, at II. Once again, the question is whether the effects of disposal of
wastes on land were considered.
26. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT I-
12 (1979); RABE, supra note 1, at 15 n.46; Kneese, Pollution anda Better Environment, 10 ARIZ. L.
REv. 11 (1968); A. KNEESE, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 16-73 (1977); M. HUFSCHMIDT, D.
JAMES, A. MESITER, B. BOWER & J. DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL SYSTEMS AND DEVELOPMENT
73-113 (1983); L. ORTOLANDO, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING 25-34 (1984); J.
LOWE, D. LEWIS & M. ATKINS, TOTAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 3 (1982).
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oil refinery. Residuals also arise when the finished products-whether
cars, machinery, disposable razors, or waste oil-are discarded rather
than re-used. Residuals may consist of either materials or energy. Mate-
rial residuals take the form of gases (such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen
dioxide and sulphur dioxide), particulates, dry solids (such as rubbish
and scrap), and wet solids (such as garbage, sewage and industrial
wastes suspended or dissolved in water). Energy residuals take the form
of noise or waste heat; for example, waste heat is returned to the atmos-
phere when coal is burned to produce electricity.2 So long as wastes
and residuals are produced, they have to go somewhere and are, there-
fore, a potential source of pollution.
The aquatic, atmospheric and terrestrial environments are capable
of performing tremendous scavenging, assimilating and dispersing
functions. Every modern society has made the fundamental assumption
that the environment can and should'be used as a medium for disposing
of wastes. When, however, the environment is incapable of coping with
residuals, or its neutralizing capacity is overburdened, pollution oc-
curs.2 8 In general, pollution laws have not absolutely prohibited the
disposal of such wastes in the environment. An absolute prohibition
would be impossible without banning many of the activities on which
Western society is dependent. What the laws have done, except in very
special circumstances, is to control only the harmful effects of poten-
tially polluting activities.29 Under such laws, discharges of harmful
residuals have been treated, processed, or redistributed in an effort to
remove the undesirable substances or render them harmless.3"
27. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 26, at 26.
28. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL RE-
PORT 6-11 (1970) [hereinafter FIRST ANNUAL REPORT]; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCE-
MENT OF SCIENCE, AIR CONSERVATION 23-39 (1965).
29. This is the underlying premise of almost all pollution control legislation. See W.
RODGERS, supra note 7 at 2-4; F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4-6 (3d ed. 1985); R. STEWART & J.
KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 25-27 (2d ed. 1978). Even some of the most stringent
pieces of legislation are not exceptions to this premise. For example, the cost-oblivious mandates
of the Clean Air Act oblige EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards for criteria pollu-
tants "allowing an adequate margin of safety." 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982). The mandates of the
Clean Water Act require industries to install "the best available technology economically achieva-
ble" by 1983. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1982). The Delaney Amendment to the federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act states that no cancer forming substances may be added to food. 21
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(a) (1982). These provisions do not constitute absolute prohibitions, but seek to
exclude pollutants which cause harm, and only to the extent that they cause harm to human health.
There are some notable exceptions to the premise. For example, the goals of the Clean
Water Act called for the elimination of discharges into navigable waters by 1985. Clean Water Act
§ 101 (a)(1) & (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(l) & (2) (1982). The prevention of significant deterioration
(psd) provisions of the Clean Air Act which designated all national parks and wilderness areas as
class one areas in order to protect these areas from significant deterioration in air quality, may also
fall within the exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 7472 (1982).
30. The attempt by the Clean Water Act to eliminate all discharges into navigable waters
has been characterized as "impossible." W. RODGERS, supra note 5, at 19.
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Unfortunately, the formidable, complicated web of law and policy
controlling pollution in the United States, and in most European indus-
trial countries, leads to a regrettable conclusion. Separate pollution
control programs for air, water and land have been established without
an adequate appreciation of the interrelated character of the three envi-
ronmental sectors, a comprehension of the total burden of pollution, or
a determination of which method of disposal would cause the least en-
vironmental damage overall. The result, in many situations, is that
present pollution controls are ineffective and inefficient.3" This conclu-
sion is not based upon an economic cost-benefit analysis, which would
require that the environment be used to its "optimal" level, but it is
consistent with political decisions to protect fragile environments or
even to protect the environment for its own sake, and is quite indepen-
dent of individual preferences based upon dollar values.
This Article will explore the basis and rationale for the fragmenta-
tion of law and policy dealing with pollution, and make the case for a
more integrated approach. In doing so, the Article will traverse the
broader issues of administrative law, policy and politics surrounding
integration. Part II will deal with the defects of fragmented controls,
explaining why such controls are ineffective from an environmentalist
standpoint while also being inefficient from an economic perspective. It
will then review the reasons leading to the adoption of a fragmented
approach to policy and law in the early 1970s. Part III attempts a pre-
liminary exposition of a functional concept of integration. It then
sharply distinguishes the integration advocated in this Article from de-
regulation and the changes urged by regulatory reformers. Part III con-
cludes by examining how integrated policies are incorporated in the
National Environmental Policy Act 32 and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.
33
Part IV explores the way ahead and argues that the time has come
for an integrated approach. A different configuration of ideas is taking
place in the 1980s. A convergence of ecological thinking and adminis-
trative policies based on rationality seems to be evolving towards inte-
gration. Part IV examines the Draft Act on environmental integration
proposed by the Conservation Foundation but concludes that the en-
actment of a new, integrated act is a near impossibility. It argues that
31. A recent example from Britain is instructive. Air pollution controls in that country
obliged a corporation to remove gaseous fluoride from a gas stream by wet scrubbing. The scrub-
bing liquor was discharged into water as a trade effluent and found its way into sewage sludge
which was spread on grazing land. As a result, cattle fed on grass fertilized by that sludge devel-
oped fluorosis. In the view of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, "a mi-
nor air pollution problem had been converted to a serious land pollution problem." RCEP No. 12,
supra note 1, 3.10, at 15.
32. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982).
33. Reorganization Plan, supra note 16.
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the tide of fragmentation could, however, be turned by the use of ex-
isting legislation and institutions. An analysis of the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976 demonstrates how this can be done.
II. THE FRAGMENTED SYSTEM
A. Defects of Fragmented Controls
A productive enterprise engaged in manufacturing, mining, log-
ging, or agriculture employs capital equipment, together with human
and non-human energy, to produce physical, chemical and biological
reactions or changes in raw materials. The purpose of the endeavor is
the creation of desired products or outputs. Residuals are the unavoid-
able corollary of such a productive activity. They vary according to the
types of inputs of raw materials and energy used in the activity, such as
coal, oil, or wood; the end products of the process, be they electricity,
petroleum, steel, or toilet paper rolls; and the process employed (a com-
bination of equipment and energy to create the desired products out of
raw materials). Boxes 1, 2, and 3 of Diagram A illustrate this produc-
tive activity.
Diagram A
IINPUTS IAIRMA MAN I
IL [5]
[21 WTREATMENT m[4] ------ [101 iPROCESS RESIDUALS and FAUNA
I DISPERSAL t
PRODUCT WATERr rFLORA
The present fragmentation of the environment by the law, policy
and administration (the fragmented approach) fails to provide effective
pollution controls for numerous reasons that Diagram A illustrates..
First, the fragmented approach does not usually consider the part
played by inputs in the creation of residuals. The relationship of inputs
to residuals can be illustrated by the coal electric industry. In a coal-
burning power plant, the combustion of coal to create electricity pro-
duces sulfur dioxide (SO2), oxides of nitrogen (NO x), particulates, bot-
tom ash, and other unwanted materials. The quantity of SO 2 generated
in combustion is a function of the sulfur content of raw coal and the
extent, if any, of its removal in coal processing or by washing. The ex-
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tent to which the sulfur content of the coal (the input) determines the
nature of the residuals has been vividly demonstrated.34 The gains
achieved by simple and inexpensive washing techniques used on high-
sulfur coal, prior to its use in production, varied from twenty to forty
percent, compared to less than fifty percent gained from employing bil-
lion-dollar scrubbers. Similarly, the burning of high quality natural gas
releases even fewer harmful residues.35
Second, the fragmented approach generally does not hold the end
product accountable for harmful residuals. Yet, the extent to which the
final product influences the residuals discharged is considerable. For
example, the production of a highly bright (bleached) white paper re-
quires substantially greater quantities of chemicals, water and energy,
resulting in the generation of larger amounts of residuals than an un-
bleached paper. One study found that the liquid residuals were reduced
by eighty-five to ninety percent, while gaseous residuals were reduced
by fifty percent, by producing unbleached paper. 36 The same argument
applies to a wide variety of end products. Accordingly, certain environ-
mental costs of the bewildering and often unnecessary products that are
paraded on the market are often ignored.
Pollution laws, in general, concentrate on end-of-line controls and
do not treat input and final products as part of the problem. When
regulating end-of-line controls on industrial processes, pollution con-
trol laws have set separate standards for air, water and land. Controls
applicable to each medium are applied and administered independently
of each other. In so doing, congressional laws have ignored the overrid-
ing law of nature that "nothing goes away." A basic law of physics
states that matter is indestructible. 37 This law dictates that the residuals
from a production process cannot be destroyed. Their initial destina-
tion may be altered, but ultimately they re-enter the flow of materials
within the environment. While limitations on discharges may correct
the immediate environmental problem to which they are directed, these
restrictions themselves often have impacts in other places. These im-
pacts, known as cross-media or inter-media pollution transfers, 38 could
happen either by direct transfers ("trade-offs") or by indirect transfers.
Direct transfers occur when control technologies aimed at achiev-
ing specific limits to pollution generate new streams of residuals which
have adverse environmental effects on other media. Unfortunately,
when limitations on discharges into one medium are imposed, those
34. Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE
L.J. 1466, 1481-82 (1980).
35. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 26, at 44.
36. Id. at 64-75.
37. See sources cited supra note 26. See also B. COMMONER, supra note 8, at 39.
38. See sources cited supra note I.
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ordering the limitation sometimes give scant attention or consideration
to the parallel impacts. The massive quantities of sludge created by ex-
isting pollution controls offer disturbingevidence of this problem. EPA
has estimated that between three and six tons of scrubber sludge may be
produced for each ton of sulphur dioxide removed from flue gases.3
9
Consequently, the problem of sulphur dioxide in the air is replaced by
one of sludge disposal. Municipal wastewater treatment and sewage
treatment plants also produce large quantities of sludge. Some of this
contains toxic substances4" which are nondegradable and bioaccumul-
able. In all, it is estimated that over 118 million metric tons of sludge are
produced annually.4 '
The troubling question is: Where does the sludge go? It could be
spread or buried on land, incinerated, or dumped at sea. But all these
solutions have attendant problems. If managed on land, there is a dan-
ger either of rain water run-off transferring heavy metal into water, or
of organic chemicals leaching into surface and ground water.42 While
sewage sludge may fertilize agricultural land, this could result in heavy
metals and organic chemicals being absorbed by plants and entering the
food chain.4 3 Incineration is possible but very expensive. Moreover,
even incinerators capable of cutting emissions by ninety percent still
produce ash containing heavy metals and organic chemicals. Burying
contaminated ash presents many of the problems of land waste disposal
that incineration was intended to avoid.44 Dumping at sea raises ques-
tions similar to those applicable to water pollution.45
Direct transfers are only part of the picture. They are compounded
by indirect transfers which take place in a number of ways. For exam-
ple, pollutants discharged into the air can leave the atmosphere through
precipitation or can adhere to particles carried by the wind and later be
deposited on land.46 Pollutants on land may erode with soil particles
into a stream, leach into groundwater, or volatilize into air. The present
fragmented system of controls does not trace the path of a pollutant
through its entire ecological chain from source to receptor. Conse-
quently, the fragmented approach does not take sufficient account of
indirect cross-media transfers. To be effective, pollution controls need
to trace and track every stage of a pollutant's journey, including its
39. CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS, supra note 1, at 8-9.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id.
42. 2 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER 124-25 (1986).
43. Feliciano, Sludge on Lands: Where We Are, But Where Are We Going?, 54 J. WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 1259-66 (1982).
44. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 14, 1988, at 6, § 1, col. 1; CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS, supra
note 1, at 9.
45. See W. Rodgers, supra note 7, at 488-99.
46. See supra note 20.
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origination in a plant, its migration through the environment, and its
final sinks or receptors. A proper risk evaluation, revealing Where and
how a substance is capable of causing harm, should be undertaken.47
Recognition of the enormous problem caused by cross-media or inter-
media transfers led the British Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution to conclude that "most of the present and future problems in
environmental pollution will be of this cross-media type," 4 and for the
National Research Council in the United States to assume that "mul-
timedia transport of pollution appears to be the rule rather than the
exception."49
Finally, the fragmented approach considers each end-of-line
source of pollution in isolation. The use of separate technologies to
control discharges into a single medium means that the effects of one set
of controls upon another are not considered, and that the waste loads
produced are not considered simultaneously. Fragmented controls
show little thought to the way in which the plant is designed, to the
manner of its operation, to the distribution of wastes, and to coordina-
tion of efforts to reduce the overall impact of pollution. The wastes or
residuals generated by an industrial activity have to go somewhere, yet
the first destination of the wastes or residuals generated by an industrial
activity is largely predetermined by plant design and pollution control
technology. Thus, in order to induce changes in technology that reduce
or eliminate some of the pollutants in question, effective pollution con-
trols should target plant design and production methods. Pollution
controls should attempt to reach the best balance of residuals. This,
however, is not usually the case.
The present approach also lacks economic efficiency. Pollution
controls already in place ensure that wastes cannot be discharged or off-
loaded onto the environment at a polluter's option. In a case where air
pollution controls require a plant to reduce air pollution, the atmos-
pheric gases and dusts created by a plant may be trapped in a spray of
water or washed out of filters. The resulting polluted water could be
discharged into a river or directly into the sea. The water could also be
piped into a lagoon to settle and dry out and then be disposed of on
land as solid waste. In this example, the efforts to meet air pollution
requirements might lead to water discharges or solid waste disposal
problems that cause greater overall damage to the environment than
might be the case if the wastes had been distributed differently. It is also
possible that other controls applicable to water and land could prevent
the wastes resulting from air pollution controls from simply being dis-
47. CROSS-MEDIA POLLUTANTS, supra note 1, at 4.
48. RCEP, No. 10, supra note. , 6.35.
49. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note I, at 4.
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charged into water or disposed of as solid waste, without further treat-
ment. Because additional costs are involved, the question becomes
whether such costs can be justified.
A more efficient and cost-effective method of pollution control
would be to divide the wastes between the three media of water, air and
land, thus making optimum use of the environment and of any special
or particular assimilative capacity it might possess. Lawmakers must
consider whether the present controls make optimal use of the environ-
ment as a resource, or whether these controls are too stringent in, one
place and too lax in another.5 0
B. Reasons for Fragmented Controls
The late 1960s and the early 1970s were a period in which the "pol-
icy primeval soup '" 51 of environmental policy bubbled with a rich mix
of ideas. Ideas based on integration prevailed and gave birth to two
notable developments: the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These developments
marked the high tide of environmentalism, yet two following pieces of
legislation flowed in a different direction. Out of the dialectic interac-
tion between fragmentation and integration, fragmentation emerged as
the more powerful policy stream.
The predominance of fragmentation is borne out first in the Clean
Air Act of 1970, which was signed into law just thirty days after EPA
began operations,52 and the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act. Both acts contained provisions dictating clear
goals, specific means by which these goals should be achieved, and rig-
orous timetables for implementing these goals and means. Such provi-
sions overran the integrative thrust of NEPA and EPA. The Clean Air
Act of 1970, for example, required EPA to set quantitative primary and
secondary air quality standards53 and to produce a timetable for (1)
designating air quality control regions,54 (2) issuance of air quality cri-
teria and information on air pollution techniques for major pollu-
tants,55 (3) establishment of ambient air quality standards for major
50. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 10-12 (1981); A.
KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 81 (1975); Krier, The Irrational
National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 324-30
(1974).
51. J. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 122-23 (1984).
52. A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE CHOOSING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY 56-57 (1980). Marcus sets out an interesting chronology tracing the parallel
developments leading to the creation of the EPA and the enactment of the Clean Air Act of 1970.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982).
54. Id. § 7407.
55. Id. § 7408.
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pollutants,5 6 (4) preparation of implementation plans by the states, 57
(5) review and revision of those plans by EPA,5" and (6) enforcement of
the plans. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(FWPCA) 59 set at least six similar legislative deadlines.6 °
The greater force of fragmentation is further evidenced by the way
in which EPA was exempted from making environmental impact as-
sessments under NEPA. A fundamentally important step towards an
integrated approach lies in ascertaining the total environmental impact
of an activity. That essential first stage is provided for in NEPA. It re-
quires that all agencies of the federal government make environmental
impact assessments where their proposed actions might significantly af-
fect the environment. 61 A plain reading of NEPA leaves no doubt that
the making of environmental regulations constitutes an action signifi-
cantly affecting the environment. It would seem to follow, therefore,
that EPA should be legally obliged to make environmental impact as-
sessments when undertaking their regulatory functions. When making
environmental impact assessments, EPA would confront the ines-
capable cross-media impacts of their regulations and be compelled to
evaluate both the wisdom and the necessity of an integrated approach.
EPA did not become engaged in this exercise for a number of rea-
sons. To begin with, Senator Edmund Muskie sought to exclude air and
water pollution controllers from the application of NEPA. 62 Addition-
ally, the deadlines in the Clean Air Act relating to the preparation of
implementation plans for meeting national ambient standards 63 argua-
56. Id. § 7409.
57. Id. § 7410(a)(1).
58. Id. §§ 7410(a)(2), 7410(c)(2).
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
60. These were to (1) issue effluent guidelines to major industrial categories by 1973, (2)
grant permits to all water pollution sources by 1974, (3) ensure that the best practicable water
pollution technology was installed by 1977, (4) make all major waterways in the United States
fishable and swimmable by 1981, (5) ensure that all polluting sources installed the best available
technology by 1983, and (6) ensure that all polluting discharges into the nation's waterways be
eliminated by 1985.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1982).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 95-115. NEPA's basic substantive policy was to
ensure that the federal government "use all practicable means and measures" to protect environ-
mental values, avoid environmental degradation, preserve historic, cultural, and natural re-
sources, and promote the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without undesirable
and unintended consequences. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982). Congress directed that to the fullest extent
possible the policies, regulations and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with NEPA and that all agencies of the federal government should
follow the procedures set out in NEPA. Id. § 4332. The procedures set out that responsible officials
of all agencies should prepare a detailed statement covering the impact of particular actions on the
environment, the environmental costs which might be avoided, and alternative measures which
might alter the cost-benefit equation. Id. § 4332(2)(c).
63. Such plans were to include adequate provision for enforcing, monitoring and limit-
ing emissions, and were designed to achieve and maintain the ambient air quality standards re-
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bly could have prevented EPA from undertaking the strict and formal
environmental assessments required by NEPA. Stringent timetables ap-
plicable to the setting of emission standards for new stationary sources
could have presented similar problems. The court in Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus64 viewed those time constraints 65 as a "substantial
consideration" in deciding that EPA was not subject to NEPA.6 6 Port-
land Cement and other cases following it, however, interpreted the new
stationary source requirements as setting out the "functional equiva-
lent" of a NEPA assessment. 67 In some instances, a regulatory author-
ity was obliged to take account of cross-media impacts. But:
[I]n other instances the relevant statutory provision would
seem to preclude considerations of effects in other media.
Thus the prospects of serious water pollution generated by air
pollution control devices such as stack scrubbers, would ap-
parently not be grounds for an extension of the deadlines for
achieving the primary ambient air standards in section 110 of
the Clean Air Act, nor would a comparable threat of air pol-
lution permit EPA to excuse an industrial source of water pol-
lution from complying with FWPCA's technology based ef-
fluent limitation deadlines.68
Finally, the express statutory exemption from NEPA assessments
granted under the FWPCA, and later under the Clean Air Act, served
to confirm and supply an even firmer foundation to the segmented and
discrete approach to pollution control embodied in some of their provi-
sions. Equally important, the exemption reflected EPA's own predilec-
ferred to. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(l) (1970). These plans had to be approved or disapproved within
four months of submission. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2). The sole criterion.for approval or disapproval of a
state implementation plan was whether it would provide for the attainment and maintenance of air
quality standards within three years from its effective date. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i). In interpreting
this provision, EPA's task force concluded that even where national standards could be met only
by creating substantial problems of water or land pollution, EPA was not empowered to reject
state plans so long as they did provide for meeting the air quality standards. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, APPLICATION OF THE NEPA To EPA's ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY Ac-
iiVnEs: TASK FORCE REPORT 18 (1973) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
64. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
65. For example, with regard to new stationary sources, the 1970 Clean Air Act directed
the Administrator to publish a list of such sources within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c (b)(I)(A)
(1970). Within 120 days after publication, EPA had to propose emission limitations, labeled "stan-
dards of performance," and promulgate final standards within 90 days of this. Id. § 1857c-6
(b)(l)(B). Thus, EPA was allowed only 300 days from the date of enactment to promulgate new
source emission standards. EPA pleaded inability to carry out the requirements of NEPA. They
argued that the specific provisions of the Clean Air Act should take priority over "any peripheral
or indirect consequences" referred to in NEPA. Brief for EPA at 21-22, Appalachian Power Co. v.
EPA, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (No. 72-1079).
66. Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 381.
67. Id. at 384.
68. R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 29, at 800.
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tions. Some analysts have suggested that the Clean Air Act and
FWPCA "failed to even pay lip service to cross-media considera-
tions,"69 but this analysis is not entirely accurate. There were some in-
tegrative strands, and as this Article argues, these strands may be
meshed with subsequent legislation to provide a more integrative web
of policy and law. In the early 1970s, however, the thrust of the Clean
Air Act, FWPCA and other legislation was decidedly segmental.
It is useful to understand why Congress legislated in the way it
did.7 To the extent that some reference to political theory is unavoida-
ble, this part of the exposition supports the dynamic view of the policy-
forming process taken by political scientists such as John Kingdon and
James Q. Wilson. Kingdon rejects the doctrinally simplistic "public
choice" 71 theories of legislation, as well as the usual political science
preoccupation with pressure and influence. 72 Instead, he makes excur-
sions into the world of ideas and politics, and recognizes their impor-
tance in the form and content of legislation.73 Wilson has clarified why
69. B. RABE, supra note i, at 11.
70. There is no pretence that what is being undertaken represents an excursion into insti-
tutional political science theory, or theories of legislation. This is no more than a modest effort to
point to ideas, concepts and persons who influenced the legislation being discussed.
71. Like Kingdon, this Article rejects the unsophisticated "public choice" model of legis-
lation advocated primarily by economists and also by a few legal camp followers. These "public
choice" theorists apply economic theory to political decisionmaking, and treat the legislative pro-
cess as a microeconomic system in which actual political choices are determined by the efforts of
individuals and groups to further their own interest. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 1-9, 17-39 (1962); A. DOWNS, AN ECo-
NOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 27-31, 291, 295 (1957); Landes& Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Easterbrook, Statutes Domain, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). For a fuller review of public choice literature, see Farber & Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv..873 (1987).
72. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132-51 (1956); D. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (2d ed. 1971) (especially vii-xii, xvii-xlviii, 501-35); A. BENTLEY, THE PRO-
CESS OF GOVERNMENT 208-22, 260-61 (1967); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 42-63 (2d ed. 1979);
E. SCHATSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 20-46 (1960); L. MILBRATH, THE WASHINGTON
LOBBYISTS 28-53 (1963); R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
127-53, 321-99 (1963); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DE-
MOCRACY 1-13, 386-410 (1986).
73. Kingdon, supra note 51. Kingdon borrows from the "garbage can" model of organi-
zational choice, described in Cohen, March & Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational
Choice. 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972), that views the political system as a garbage can in which
"streams" exist. The streams consist of "problem recognition," "policy proposals," and "polit-
ics." Id. at 92. He suggests that the enactment of a law requires the convergence of all three
streams, together with the presence of an "entrepreneur" to guide the law's passage through Con-
gress. Kingdon's analysis can be adapted and applied to the Clean Air Act and FWPCA to explain
their form and shape. "Problem recognition" consisted of how air and water pollution was per-
ceived. The felt necessities of the time dictated that a serious problem existed. "Politics" refers to
the state of public opinion, which after "Earth Day" was running heavily in favor of fast and
effective environmental action. The "policy proposals" which arose in response to the perceived
environmental crisis were influenced by a powerfully articulated disenchantment with New Deal
beliefs in the ability of expert administrators to solve social problems.. The "entrepreneurs" re-
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the politics of legislation and regulation cannot be explained by one
neat model of predictive behavior based on rent-seeking legislators.74
1. DISAFFECTION WITH NEW DEAL IDEALISM
The crucible of ideas in the 1960s gave rise to two different currents
of thinking. On the one hand, environmentalism in the late 1960s was
rooted in holistic and ecological thinking which found expression in the
enactment of NEPA and the creation of EPA. On the other hand, seri-'
ous doubts about whether the New Deal belief in independent and ex-
pert administrative agencies could creatively regulate a complex social
problem in the public interest affected the approaches taken to environ-
mental problems.75 As we shall see in Section III C.1, beliefs in inter-
connected ecosystems offer a holistic, rather than a fragmented, view of
the world. Translating this world view into practice required the inte-
gration of political and administrative policies dealing with the envi-
ronment. Air, water and land were part of one environment and did not
constitute separate and discrete entities. However, the complex and un-
certain nature of environmental problems did not admit of preordained
solutions. To legislate in advance on how the balance should be struck
in the myriad of situations crying out for solutions would only create
procrustean beds. Pollution control required fine and expert balancing
that could best be done by expert and sensitive agencies vested with
power over the whole environment and empowered to act in the partic-
ular circumstances of the case. An integrated approach called for a
broad delegation of power. Arguments for integration based on ecolog-
ical thinking, however, were countered by others which resisted the
granting of wide discretionary power.
During the New Deal, champions of the administrative process
prevailed with their view that there was an objective public interest that
could be ascertained and implemented by expert administrators.
7 6
Their approach came under heavy attack from political scientists 77 on
constitutional and political grounds. The constitutional objection has
sponsible for the Clean Air Act and FWPCA were Ralph Nader and Senator Edmund Muskie,
respectively.
74. Wilson divides the politics of legislation and regulation into four types: majoritarian,
interest group, client and entrepreneurial. J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367-70 (1980).
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
75. Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 34, at 1468.
76. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1682-85 (1975); Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 34, at 1471-74; Sunstein, Constitutionalism After
the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 460-61 (1987).
77. Jaffe, The New Deal Agency-A New Scapegoat, 65 YALE L.J. 1068 (1956). See also
Jaffe, supra note 10, at 232 (pointing out that lawyers, as distinct from political scientists, were
partial to the independent administrative agencies).
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still not been resolved, 7" but the political argument has nevertheless
prevailed. Those attacking the technocratic philosophy charged that in-
dependent agencies, having no duly constituted master, were falling
under the domination of private interests, usually the very interests
whose activities they were supposed to regulate.7 9 A somewhat differ-
ent criticism was leveled by economists who saw regulation as being
inefficient because it was created and administered for the benefit of
well-organized interests at the expense of the public. These critics either
advocated deregulation or regulatory reform. Ironically, political and
economic critics of regulation agreed that regulation benefitted the reg-
ulated rather than the public.8"
By the end of the 1960s, much of the regulation in the United
States was seen to be in "deep trouble."'" It became necessary to face
up to the problem of how agencies had misused and even abused the
broad delegated power conferred upon them. Confidence in the ability
of administrative agencies to implement statutes effectively and in the
public interest had apparently evaporated. Many influential commenta-
tors referred to the problems arising out of the unsatisfactory or inade-
quate implementation of the legislative mandates given to administra-
tive agencies. They suggested that one way of remedying this problem
lay in statutes with clear mandates and definite obligations."2 One rea-
son for the malaise was the nature of the legislative mandate. According
to one critic, statutory mandates lacked clarity and rarely provided
clear directions to the new agency.83 The vagueness was deliberate and
resulted from the lobbying of well-organized private groups who were
the subject of the regulation. Having failed in their efforts to prevent the
78. The constitutional objection was, first, that all executive functions should be subject
to presidential control and that independent agencies were a headless fourth branch of govern-
ment. Secondly, it was argued that these independent agencies combined powers previously dis-
tributed among the three traditional branches. See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 128 (2d ed. 1985).
79. See, e.g., T. Lowi, supra note 72; R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS-
SION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE ICC 311-25 (1970); J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST 185-246
(1970).
80. See sources cited infra note 179; P. MACAVOY, THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY
AGENCIES (1970). For a succinct survey of these criticisms, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART, supra note
78, at 36-38. For a fuller discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 178-221.
81. R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 110 (1971). Whether this perception was valid is
open to question. See J. WILSON, supra note 74, at 362.
82. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 286 (1955);
Bernstein set up an influential model of agency obsolescence in which he traced the cycle of a
regulatory agency from gestation to youth, youth to maturity, and maturity to old age when the
agency suffered debility and decline and "surrendered" to the regulated. Id. at 74-102. See also K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 9-53 (1958); H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 165-68 (1962); T. LowL, supra note
72.
83. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 75-76.
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enactment of legislation affecting them, these private groups concen-
trated on making the regulatory provisions as vague and innocuous as
possible,"4 confident that they could "capture" the agency in question.
The unwillingness or inability of Congress to give better directives to its
agencies was also criticized.85
Professor Kenneth C. Davis, in his Administrative Law Treatise
and later in his book Discretionary Justice,86 had demonstrated with
compelling and devastating effect, the injustice and dangers of unneces-
sarily wide delegation of discretionary power. In his book The End of
Liberalism,8 7 Theodore Lowi synthesized the criticisms of the New
Deal agencies and suggested that one remedy for many of their troubles
might lie in statutes which had clear goals and explicit means of imple-
mentation.8 8 These new statutory norms would target and institution-
alize the public needs which led to the statute in the first place, and
would make it difficult for the agency to postpone the performance of
its obligations.89 One of the central themes present when environmen-
tal legislation was being formed, therefore, was that expertise could be
an excuse for inaction, and even worse, could be captured by special
interests. The remedy suggested by believers in regulation was the en-
actment of legislation setting forth explicit goals, specific means by
which these goals could be attained, and rigorous timetables in which to
do so.
2. PRAGMATISM AND INCREMENTALISM
Another compelling policy stream which converged with New
Deal dissatisfaction with expert solutions to complicated problems was
that of pragmatic incrementalism or "muddling through." A number of
writers emphasized the incremental nature of policy formulation and
decisionmaking9° and doubted the practical applicability of a compre-
hensively rational model of decisionmaking. They pointed out that
decisionmakers have neither the assets nor the time to collect the infor-
mation required for rational choice. When making choices, deci-
sionmakers do not confront a limited universe of relevant conse-
84. Id. at 96.
85. H. FRIENDLY, supra note 82, at 168.
86. See supra note 82; K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1977).
87. See supra note 72.
88. This was not the only suggested method of relief. Others demanded that the agencies
should redeem their M~ew Deal promise by generating clear standards through creative rule-
making. See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 34, at 1479. Another solution was to look to the
courts for action. See Jaffe, supra note 10, at 235.
89. T. Lowi, supra note 72, at 125-56.
90. E.g., D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION 37-57, 61-110
(1963); R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 82-88 (1953).
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quences; instead, they face an open system of variables in which all
consequences cannot be surveyed. A decisionmaker attempting to ad-
here to the tenets of a rationalistic model will become frustrated, ex-
haust his resources without coming to a decision, and remain without
an effective decisionmaking model to guide him. 9' With specific refer-
ence to environmental policy, Charles Lindblom was skeptical about
integrated environmental management. At a conference organized
under the auspices of the EPA in 1973, he articulated his doubts about a
policy which adopted an holistic approach to the environment. He ar-
gued that precisely because everything is interconnected, the environ-
mental problem is beyond our capacity to control in one unified policy.
The very enormity of the interconnected environment makes it impossi-
ble to treat as a whole. Critical points of intervention (tactically defensi-
ble or strategically defensive points of intervention) must be found.92
According to this argument, a step-by-step approach will solve a prob-
lem better than one based upon the necessarily incomplete analysis of-
fered by comprehensive rationality.
The appeal of incrementalism as an approach to environmental
protection becomes immediately evident. When faced with a particu-
larly difficult problem of pollution in one medium, the natural response
is to solve that problem. An environmental crisis usually manifests itself
in one medium, and its linkage with other media is often unknown.
Finding time to devise a comprehensively rational way of dealing with
the problem required exceptional sagacity, especially when from Bos-
ton to Washington, a summer-long siege of "daily air pollution alerts"
left "little doubt . . that the country was facing an air pollution cri-
sis." 93 Congressman Rogers, referring to the problems of air pollution,
could well have been echoing the feelings of fellow congressmen in
stressing the immediacy of the problem: "Air pollution is one of the
most pressing forms of pollution because unlike others, the air around
us is unavoidable. We do not have to swim or look at dying lakes. But
91. In his well-known article The Science of Muddling Through, Professor Charles
Lindblom explained that a "rational-comprehensive" analysis which adopts a synoptic view of a
problem, collects all relevant information, and explores all relevant solutions after considering all
relevant answers, in order to arrive at a policy decision, is quite impossible. Such an approach,
which is admittedly marked by .clarity of objective, explicitness of evaluation, a high degree of
comprehensiveness of overview, and possible quantification of values for mathematical analysis,
was only possible when dealing with small scale problems with a very limited number of variables.
Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PuB. ADMIN. REv. 79, 79-82 (1959) [hereinafter
Lindblom, Muddling]. He has suggested, therefore, that poor as it is, incremental politics ordina-
rily offers the best chance of offering beneficial political changes. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not
Yet Through, 39 Pun. ADMIN. REV. 517, 521 (1979).
92. Lindblom, Incrementalism and Environmentalism, in MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT
83 (1973).
93. 116 CONG. REC. 42,381 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie).
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everyone must breathe." 94 In that context, the need to do something
about air pollution at least, and to cross one bridge at a time, becomes
understandable. The same was true of water pollution, and politicians
responded to the call for quick, demonstrable action against pollution
in the legislation that followed.
3. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
A fragmented approach to legislation also arose from the way in
which jurisdiction over environmental legislation was carved up be-
tween congressional committees.9 5 Environmental legislation is almost
entirely drafted and piloted through Congress by committees. It is a
rare occurrence for the full House or Senate to overturn a committee
decision.96 The committees responsible for various aspects of environ-
mental law and policy guard their jurisdiction jealously.9 In the late
1960s and the early 1970s, the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollu-
tion Control of the Public Works Committee had the primary responsi-
bility for air and water pollution legislation. It was headed by Senator
Muskie, then the dominant congressional figure in pollution control.
98
Another committee which assumed some influence and importance in
formulating environmental policy was the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, chaired by Senator Henry Jackson. He was the architect
of NEPA, which sought to place environmental policy within an inte-
grated framework. 99 Muskie resisted attempts to extend NEPA to air
and water pollution control agencies. At one level, his approach to
NEPA was an exercise in turf protection.' Accordingly, it has been
suggested that Muskie was more concerned with keeping air and water
pollution control under the jurisdiction of the subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Public Works Committee, which he chaired, than with preventing
integration. He was engaged in the gambit of preventing encroachment
94. 116 CONG. REC. 19,210 (1970).
95. Committee jurisdiction covers three areas: (I) formulating and approving legisla-
tion, (2) conducting oversight hearings and investigations, and (3) reviewing and approving appro-
priations. See J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 61-79 (2d ed. 1976).
96. Id. at 61.
97. It has been pointed out that "jurisdictional politics is an ubiquitous feature of
present day congressional policy making. To hold jurisdiction means to claim a piece of the action.
Therefore, jurisdiction is as central to the life of a member or a congressional subunit as votes or
the ability to hire staff." Davidson, Subcommittee Government: New Channels for Policy Making,
in THE NEW CONGRESS 118-19 (T. Mann & N. Ornstein eds. 1981).
98. J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 95, at 63-66; A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 53-78.
99. See supra note 62.
100. Professors Ackerman and Stewart have noted that powerful organized interests such
as congressional committees have vested interests in protecting the status quo. Ackerman & Stew-
art, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (1985).
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on the agencies under his committee by Jackson's Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee, which had drafted NEPA.° "
The symbiotic political relationship between public interest activ-
ists and subcommittee chairpersons interested in gaining national
prominence has been explained and substantiated. 0 2 What happened
with the Clean Air Act was strikingly different. Muskie had been the
chief architect of the air and water pollution legislation passed by Con-
gress in the 1960s, and his Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pol-
lution began drafting amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1970. Case
studies on the enactment of the Clean Air Act reveal the extent to which
Ralph Nader's intervention, through the publication of John Esposito's
Vanishing Air in 1970, led to a dramatic tightening of the provisions of
the final bill presented by Muskie's subcommittee.' 3 They also reveal
the extent to which Muskie's presidential campaign in 1972 made him
especially vulnerable to political pressure of the entrepreneurial kind.
James Q. Wilson has clarified four different manifestations of the
politics of legislation and regulation: majoritarian, interest group, cli-
ent and entrepreneurial. According to Wilson, the Clean Air Act of
1970 was not the result of interest group politics, but rather the en-
trepreneurial politics of Ralph Nader."0 4 Wilson's explanation is con-
101. Comment, Implementation of the Clean Air Act: Should NEPA Apply to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency?, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 597, 602 (1973) [hereinafter Should NEPA Apply];
Comment, Kalur v. Resor, Water Quality and NEPA's Application to EPA, 2 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,025, 10,029 (1972) [hereinafter Water Quality]. For a seemingly contrary view, see Liroff, who
suggests that "[w]hile the Senators' disagreements were largely based on jurisdictional jealousies,
they derived as well from a fundamental difference in outlook concerning the manner in which
protection for environmental values should be provided in federal decision making." R. LIROFF, A
NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 11 (1976). It would seem, however, that this 'fundamen-
tal difference' related to the efficacy of policing NEPA, and not to the need for integrated environ-
mental evaluation and action. Id. at 18-20.
102. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PRE-
DICAMENT 145 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
103. A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 53-85; ACIR, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 10, at 23-24; Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, Towarda Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Feder-
alization of Environmental Law, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 313 (1985).
104. Traditional interest group politics sees legislation as the outcome of a competitive
struggle among groups with differing interests. See supra note 72. However, Wilson's persuasive
analysis limits the application of interest group politics to situations in which the public at large do
not see themselves being affected by a regulation. See supra note 74. A regulation attracting inter-
est group politics will typically benefit a small group at the expense of a comparable small group.
Each side has a strong incentive to organize and exercise political influence. Majoritarian politics is
found where the costs and benefits of a contemplated action are widely distributed and most of
society is expected to gain or pay. Interest groups have little incentive to form around such issues
because no small, definable segment of society, such as an industry, occupation or locality, can
expect to capture a disproportionate share of the benefits. Where cost6 and benefits are narrowly
concentrated, conditions are ripe for interest group politics. Where the benefits of a prospective
policy are concentrated, but the costs widely distributed, client politics is likely to result. Some
small, easily organized group will benefit, and thus have a powerful incentive to organize and
lobby. Since the costs of the benefit are distributed at a low per capita rate over a large number of
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sistent with an arresting theory of the "prisoner's dilemma" offered by
Elliot, Ackerman 'and Millian.1 °5 They argue that the Clean Air Act
was enacted at a time when environmentalists were not well organized
as an interest group in Washington. Accordingly, interest group politics
as usually understood did not operate. However, there did exist unre-
strained competition between two presidential aspirants-President
Nixon and Senator Muskie'° 6-for credit from legislation assuring the
public of a cleaner world. In 1970, Muskie was vulnerable not only be-
cause he was a presidential candidate, but also because the 1967 Air
Quality Act, which he had drafted, was not working satisfactorily.' 0 7
Elliot, Ackerman and Millian's theory appears to be well substantiated
by the sequence of events leading to the Clean Air Act. On December
10, 1969, Muskie introduced a bill which sought little more than an
incremental change to the law controlling air pollution.', Two months
later, Nixon submitted his own proposals to Congress calling for a far
more substantial change in the law, necessitating a major structural
change in existing federal air pollution statutes.10 9 Three weeks after
Nixon's proposal, Nader's task force published their report harshly
criticizing Muskie and alleging that he was soft on industry." 0 In Au-
gust, Muskie's subcommittee reported out a revised bill which essen-
tially followed Nixon's proposals but was even tougher. That tougher
and more stringent law-the 1970 Clean Air Act-was subsequently
signed into law by Nixon, despite his grave reservations over its exact-
people, there is little incentive to organize in opposition. Finally, where a policy is proposed that
will confer general but small benefits at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment of society, we
witness entrepreneurial politics. Where this is the case, the incentive to organize is strong for oppo-
nents of the policy, but weak for the beneficiaries while the political system provides many points
at which opposition can be registered. In these circumstances, it requires the efforts of a skilled
entrepreneur who can mobilize latent public sentiment, associate the legislation with widely shared
values, and put the opponents of the plan publicly on the defensive.
105. Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 103.
106. Senator Muskie was chairman of the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Committee on Public Works. He had been involved in pollution control for many years
and was a frontrunner among the Democratic Party's candidates for president. See generally A.
MARCUS, supra note 52, at 53-82.
107. Id.
108. Marcus' characterization of it as a "minor tinkering" with the 1967 law has been
endorsed by Elliot, Ackerman & Millian. Id at 60; Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 103.
109. "Environmental Quality: The Presidential Message to Congress Recommending a
37 Point Administrative and Legislative Program," WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc., 160, 164 (1970).
The proposals, though advocating a qualitative change to the existing structure of air pollution by
establishing nationwide air quality standards and national emission standards, was still frag-
mented in its approach and dealt with air, water and solid waste management as if they were
independent and separate problems. The message, however, did recognize that federal institutions
dealing with the environment and natural resources had developed piecemeal over the years, and it
appointed Roy Ash to make a thorough study of the organization of federal environmental, natu-
ral resource and oceanographic programs. Id. at 171. It was the work of the Ash reorganization
study that laid the foundations for EPA. See generally A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 31-52.
110. J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR 290-92 (1970).
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ing demands on industry. Elliot, Ackerman and Millian's conclusions
are that Nader's report, threatening Muskie with the loss of his reputa-
tion as Mr. Clean, had the effect of trapping both Nixon and Muskie in
a politician's dilemma. The report compounded pressure on both politi-
cians by exploiting the difficulty that the public has in identifying politi-
cians who deserve credit for enacting legislation in response to per-
ceived need. As a result, both were forced to support legislation more
stringent than either would have preferred.
Unfortunately, the Nader organization, while executing a remark-
able coup, also succeeded in further entrenching the fragmented ap-
proach. Though they were scathing critics of the bureaucratic inertia
displayed by the National Air Pollution Control Administration
(NAPCA) in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW),'1t Esposito and Nader displayed little awareness of the inter-
related nature of the problem of air pollution. They denigrated the diffi-
culties of pollution control caused by the need to relate emission stan-
dards to ambient air quality standards. They ridiculed the reliance on
experts. " 2 Underlying their criticisms was a deep suspicion of the view
that the atmosphere should be used to its optimal capacity. This view
was seen as the basis on which the environment was exploited and plun-
dered by corporate polluters in city after city. '1 3 Overall, these criti-
cisms reflected dissatisfaction with bureaucratic implementation and a
disillusionment with the New Deal ideal of expert administrators. The
Nader answer, insofar as one was offered, appeared to be a visible and
simple one: clear national emission standards.114 That proposal was
only partially adopted by the Clean Air Act. Instead, Muskie's subcom-
mittee finally set forth explicit goals accompanied by defined means,
clear deadlines and rigorous timetables. In so doing, Muskie's subcom-
mittee sought "handles" '115 on environmental degradation that were
fixed to fragmented and incremental solutions to the problems of dirty
air.
4. BUREAUCRATIC PREFERENCE
The EPA was created by the Nixon Administration with the spe-
cific objective of integrating the various legislative mandates entrusted
to it. Nixon's Administration envisioned an EPA that would end much
11l. Id. at vii-ix (Nader commenting in foreword to the book).
112. Id. at 264. Admittedly, the immediate reference was to company experts, but the
implications were clearly spelled out. NAPCA experts relied upon the "already well established
tyranny of indentured experts." Id.
113. Id.at259-98.
114. Id. at 307.
115. See A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 70-71.
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of the fragmentation of environmental policy. Douglas Costle, who
later became EPA's administrator, directed the White House task force
that handled the transition between congressional approval of the new
agency and the actual start of EPA's operations. Costle believed that a
reorganization of environmental regulation along functional lines was
the desired long-term goal; however, he advocated that an incremental
strategy was preferred in the short term.' 1 6
Costle recommended a three-stage plan. Initially, the five pro-
grams dealing with air, water, pesticides, solid waste and radiation, and
noise would be preserved. After a period of time, three new assistant
administrative offices would be created along functional lines, dealing
with planning and management, standards and compliance, and re-
search and monitoring. The five individual programs would, however,
retain their separate identity in administrative offices. Finally, after the
passage of a reasonable amount of time, the program distinctions were
to be eliminated entirely."'
There were a number of reasons for Costle's caution in pushing
forward with integration. To begin with, the differing policy streams
leading to the creation of EPA and the passage of the 1970 Clean Air
Act, proceeded along parallel paths."' The White House's vision of
comprehensive environmental management leading to the creation of
EPA was not a vision shared by Congress or embodied in the Clean Air
Act of 1970. Consequently, EPA mirrored a curious policy division. On
the one hand, it housed those loyal to the original philosophy of NEPA
and EPA, while on the other, it was staffed by those committed to a
programmatic administration based on fragmented policies. EPA was
unprecedented in terms of the number and size of disparate agencies
brought under a new organizational roof." 9 In many cases, the agen-
cies had been rivals who enjoyed substantial autonomy. Costle rea-
soned that there would be resistance and disruption if integration were
attempted immediately. 12 ° Most bureaucrats within EPA had a pro-
gram perspective. They were tied to specific legislation, functions and
116. Id. at 104.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 54-57.
119. There were 10 major administrative units in all. The Federal Water Quality Admin-
istration from the Interior Department was the largest with 2670 employees and a budget of over
$1 billion. NAPCA from HEW was second largest with 1100 employees and a budget of $1 10
million. Other major units included the Pesticides Regulation Division from the Agriculture De-
partment with 425 employees, the Bureau of Radiological Health from HEW with 350 employees,
and the Office of Pesticides Research from HEW with 275 employees. Cohen, EPA: A Qualified
Success, in CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 179 (S. Kamieniecki, R. O'Brien & M.
Clarke eds. 1986).
120. A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 103-04; J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 95, at 107-
12; ACIR, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 22.
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appropriations. They took their cues from Congress and reflected the
pragmatic, fragmented policies of that body. 
121
Second, Costle feared that the agency would undergo a period of
confusion and even chaos while its programmatic inheritance was bro-
ken down and rebuilt along functional lines. 12 2 The resulting confusion
would prevent it from meeting the obligations of its legislative man-
dates and particularly the inflexible demands of the Clean Air Act. He
feared the agency would come out badly injured after such a baptism of
fire. This difficulty was compounded by the fear that managers of
EPA's program sections would not go along with a fully integrated
plan.
William Ruckelshaus, EPA's first administrator, appeared to be
even more apprehensive than Costle. He accepted and carried out the
first two phases of Costle's plan, but not the third phase which was to
fully integrate EPA. 123 The primary reason for this was that even the
limited division of duties in the second phase had led to conflict and
restlessness. Apart from being nervous about their position and pros-
pects in a new organization, the bureaucrats he had inherited from
other departments and programs were loyal to specific statutes and pro-
grams and were unable to view the environment as a whole. These bu-
reaucrats were familiar with, and committed to, these particular legisla-
tive mandates, and feared that concrete directives were in danger of
being ignored in the move towards integration. They also had access to
senators and representatives of congressional committees who had en-
acted such legislation and continued to supervise its implementation.
Faced with the prospect of bureaucratic resistance and congressional
criticism, Ruckelshaus decided to play safe."24 These initial rumblings
of discontent, signifying a bureaucratic preference for fragmentation,
led to EPA's plea that it be excluded from NEPA, and set the stage for
EPA's virtual rejection of an integrated approach.
125
121. J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 95, at 108.
122. A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 103.
123. The initial history of the EPA is recounted by Marcus. Id. at 85-119; See also J.
DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 95, at 108-18. Today, the Ruckelshaus design remains basically
unchanged and "continues to be stuck in the same half-programmatic, half functional pattern."
DAVIS, The United States: Experiment and Fragmentation, in INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (N. Haigh & F. Irwin eds. 1989) (forthcoming).
124. A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 101-06; Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 275-77 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
125. It may be possible to explain Ruckelshaus' behavior on the basis that the crucial
concern of any agency head is how to maintain the agency as a viable, credible, steady institution,
rather than to make decisions that achieve the agency's prescribed goals. See, e.g., C. BARNARD,
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE 215, 231-34, 251-57 (1966); J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS 9-10, 13 (1973); P. SELZNICK, TVA AND GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FOR-
MAL ORGANIZATIONS 12-13 (1969).
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In several cases in which the issue was raised,126 EPA insisted that
it was not bound by the provisions of NEPA and sought to justify its
position on broad policy grounds. The foundation of its policy argu-
ment was based on the nature of the objectives and deadlines embodied
in the statutes EPA administers, especially the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts. The objectives and deadlines of these acts required rapid
and expeditious action that would be delayed by the time involved in
complying with NEPA procedures. Further, EPA argued that both acts
precluded consideration of the environment as a whole, and by implica-
tion, stood in the way of an integrated approach to pollution control.
EPA advanced these arguments in Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus. 127 In
Anaconda, the plaintiff industry sought to demonstrate that the control
strategy and emission standard for sulfur dioxide proposed by EPA,
which referred to state implementation plans, would create an "enor-
mous solid waste disposal problem." 121 On appeal, the district court's
holding that EPA should comply with NEPA was vacated. The court of
appeals held that EPA's action was not subject to judicial review.
129
The reasoning of the district court in Anaconda was rejected as "my-
opic" in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,130 a case dealing with
new source performance standards. The plaintiff industries argued, in-
ter alia, that NEPA applied and that EPA should carry out a detailed
cost-benefit analysis that evaluated pollution reduction levels against
incremental increases in industry expenditure. 131 The court decided
that it was not necessary to reach the broad question of NEPA's appli-
cability to EPA because section 111 of the Clean Air Act constituted a
narrow exemption from NEPA. 132 Judge Leventhal resolved that any
determination of the "best system of emission reduction" which took
126. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); Buckeye Power Inc.,
v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 427 U.S. 902 (1976); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972),
rev'd, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973); Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del.
1972), af/'d, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Environmental De-
fense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116 (D.Md. 1976).
127. See supra note 126; Should NEPA Apply, supra note 101, at 622.
128. Id. (citing Brief for Anaconda Co. at 38, Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp.
697 (D. Colo. 1972) (No. C-4362)).
129. Anaconda, 482 F.2d at 1301. First, because Congress had made the court of appeals
the exclusive forum, and second, because the proposed regulation had not yet been adopted. Id. at
1304-05.
130. 486 F.2d 375.
131. Should NEPA Apply, supra note 101, at 617 (citing Brief for Portland Cement Ass'n
at 35, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (No. 72-1073)).
132. Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 384.
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"into account the cost of achieving such reduction" 133 constrained the
Administrator to consider counterproductive environmental effects, as
well as the cost to industry. 134 Together with a statement of reasons,
these factors constituted the "functional equivalent" of a NEPA impact
statement and exempted EPA from the stricter requirements of
NEPA. 135 The fact that the time involved in complying with NEPA, as
interpreted by the courts, would have prevented EPA from meeting the
rigorous and inflexible time schedules set out in the Clean Air Act was
regarded as a "substantial," even if it was not a decisive,
consideration. 1
36
A similar decision was reached in Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckel-
shaus,13 7 a case consolidated with Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA.
138
The petitioner corporation maintained, inter alia, that in promulgating
standards for sulfuric acid, EPA had failed to consider the adverse im-
pact on water caused by tail gas scrubbers which the new source per-
formance standards required. 139 The corporation argued that EPA
should have complied with NEPA. EPA admitted in response that the
setting of standards might involve other environmental impacts. How-
ever, because the language establishing NEPA was general and the pro-
visions of the Clean Air Acts were specific, the specific provisions
should prevail. 140 EPA argued that strict time limits were set for com-
pliance because the Clean Air Act was based on the premise that air
pollution was at crisis levels. 14 ' The application of NEPA would be
inconsistent with the time constraints central to the Clean Air Act. The
court found no reason to divert from or expand on the logic of the
Portland Cement decision, and held that NEPA impact statements were
not a condition to making section 111 determinations.
142
The court in Kalur v. Resort43 went against the tide, and held that
the Army Corps of Engineers was fully subject to NEPA in exercising
its powers under the Refuse Act Permit Program. The Corps of Engi-
neers could not delegate its statutory authority under the Refuse Act to
EPA. ' 44 Congress responded by exempting EPA from that responsibil-
ity. The Clean Water Act does not require EPA to prepare impact state-
133. Id. at 385.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 384.
136. Id. at 381.
137. 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 439.
140. Brief for EPA at 21, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(No. 72-1079).
141. Id. at 15. See also Should NEPA Apply, supra note 101, at 606.
142. Appalachian Power, 486 F.2d at 431.
143. 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971).
144. Id. at 14-15.
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ments to accompany its actions except when dealing with grants to mu-
nicipalities for waste treatment facilities or with permits for discharges
from new sources.' 4 Similarly, the Energy Supply and Environmental
Co-ordination Act of 1974 provided that no action taken by EPA under
the Clean Air Act required an environmental impact statement.146 Fur-
thermore, EPA determined that regulations under the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Toxic Substances Control Act
of 1976, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Noise Control Act are
exempt from NEPA.1
47
As a result, while policies and laws based on integrated perspec-
tives did exist, they were swamped by a confluence of policies and polit-
ics. Those policies and politics, as we have seen, included dissatisfaction
with New Deal administration, incrementalism, the competition for en-
vironmental credit between President Nixon and Senators Muskie and
Jackson, rivalry between congressional committees, and the preference
of bureaucrats for programmatic administration.
III. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
A. Towards a Concept of Integration
The sheer magnitude and complexity of an integrated analysis does
pose serious problems for its practical application. Lindblom has an
important point to make in his criticism of the rational model of admin-
istration when pointing out that a comprehensive evaluation of how a
given decision might affect all other decisions can be quite unrealis-
tic.' 4 ' The need to be realistic affords one good reason for distinguish-
ing environmental integration from economic models of decision-
making and regulatory reform that are based upon comprehensive
studies of all risks. 149 This still leaves us with questions about the prin-
ciples upon which an integrated approach should proceed.
This section will discuss the frameworks within which an inte-
grated approach could be structured. The reference to an integrated
approach to pollution control should not obscure the fact that a multi-
tude of forms are implied by such an approach. An integrated approach
can be applied in a myriad of ways and assume a variety of patterns.
The principles of an integrated approach lend themselves to diverse
combinations and permutations that can be applied in variegated cir-
145. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1982).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1982).
147. 44 Fed. Reg. 64,174 (1979).
148. Lindblom, Muddling, supra note 91; Pliffner, Administrative Rationality, 20 PUB. AD-
MIN. REv. 125 (1960). See also supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 178-221.
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cumstances. The manner and form of integration could, therefore, dif-
fer from case to case.
1. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
The first principle underlying an integrated approach is that pollu-
tion control should be based upon an holistic, rather than a discrete or
segmented, view of the environment. The environment should not be
artificially divided into separate areas of air, water and land. A neces-
sary corollary of this premise is that administrative structures dealing
with environmental protection should be capable of dealing with the
environment as a whole.150
Secondly, an integrated approach requires that the major deficien-
cies of a fragmented approach be corrected. Both inputs and final prod-
ucts must be considered, and systematic environmental assessments
should be made across all three media-a "longitudinal" analysis. Fi-
nally, cross-media pollution controls based on integrated analysis
should be adopted. "' These principles appear attractive and worthy of
praise. They could be accepted and acclaimed rather like motherhood
and blueberry pie. The real difficulty lies in applying them. While the
exact manner of their application is beyond the compass of this Article,
an appreciation of the core problem of implementation will be consid-
ered in this discussion.
2. COMPARATIVE LESSONS
The environment in which we live cannot be encapsulated within
national boundaries. The bio-physical problems caused by pollution in
different parts of the world are often identical and can resist indepen-
dent national solutions. An exposure to, and a study of, comparative
experiences may shed light on possible solutions.' 52 The difficulties en-
countered by fragmented controls figure significantly among the shared
environmental problems of the international community. A transna-
tional perspective offers a vantage point from which to gain some im-
pression of how others perceive the problems arising out of fragmented
controls, as well as the nature of any integrated responses to those
150. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, STEPS TOWARD A STABLE FUTURE
5, 7, 15, 17 (1986) [hereinafter STABLE FUTURE].
151. See supra, Diagram A.
152. While problems found in other areas of law such as tort, contract, administration,
property, corporations and criminal law have varying degrees of similarity and encourage compar-
ative inquiry, the unique, obvious and inescapable commonality of environmental problems make
comparisons between environmental regimes in different countries a more rewarding subject of
study. For the international dimensions of cross-media pollution, see Teclaff & Teclaff, Interna-
tional Control of Cross-Media Pollution-An Ecosystems Approach, 27 NAT. REs. J. 21 (1987).
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problems. In addition to the United Kingdom,' 53 the Commission of
the European Communities,' 54 Sweden 155 and the Netherlands'
5 6
have taken some steps towards integrated pollution controls.
The United Kingdom has a long history of pollution control legis-
lation. This legislation initially dealt with public health 157 and now
boasts an extensive corpus of laws, policies, and agencies spanning land
use planning and the control of pollution in general. 1 58 These laws and
153. See infra text accompanying notes 157-64.
154. Resolution on the Continuation and Implementaion of an Action Programme For The
Period 1987-1992, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. No.C. 289 3 (1987) (resolution of the Council of the Euro-
pean Communities adopted October 19, 1987). The text of the Action Programme is found in
Commission of the European Communities, Draft for a Resolution of the Fourth Action Pro-
gramme, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. NO.C. 70 3-45 (1987) [hereinafter Action Programme]. Action pro-
grams are the instruments by which the Commission of the European Communities outlines its
legislative intentions. There have been four such programs in the last 15 years, and they provide a
policy framework within which European Community environmental laws will be made. They are
not legislative schedules, but incorporate broad formulations of policy. Not all the policies set out
in action programs are the subject of legislation. These action programs, nonetheless, offer good
evidence of the direction of European Community policy and law. See N. HAIGH, EEC ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY AND BRITAIN 9-Il (2d ed. 1987).
155. In Sweden, the Environment Protection Act of 1969 laid the foundations for cross-
media pollution control by providing that pollution should be controlled at its source. This act
replaced the existing sectoral control by providing that pollution "from land, buildings or installa-
tions," whether it be caused by water, air or land or take the form of noise, should come within its
jurisdiction. The authority to grant permits to major polluting sources is placed in the hands of the
National Franchise Board. One permit covers discharges to air, water and land. In deciding what
the permissible limits of pollution should be, Sweden does not rely upon predetermined standards,
whether they be ambient or source related, but on the best practicable technological means. Even
though major pollutants are regulated according to the environmental medium of release, each
waste stream is ultimately assessed according to its contribution to the totality of pollution.
Hinrichson, Integrated Permitting and Inspection in Sweden (ch. 7), in INTEGRATED POLLUTION
CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, supra note 123.
156. The Netherlands boasts of a comprehensive body of environmental law and policy
which is being adapted to incorporate a cross-media approach. Prior to 1984, a permit system
operated in the differing media, and the granting of permits was influenced by broad policy decla-
rations called "indicative multi-year programmes." By the late 1970s, the limitations inherent in
dividing environmental protection into separate compartments became clear, and work began on
transforming the entire system into an integrated regime. In order to effect this transformation,
much of the existing legislation will be superseded by a broad framework act, granting power to
control pollution at the source. Law and policy under the framework act, together with strategic
and operational plans and environmental impact assessments, will constitute the foundations for
cross-media pollution control. The structure of environmental administration which is built along
single medium lines will, however, remain unchanged. See J. DE GRAFFE & J. POLACK, THE LAW
AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE NETHERLANDS (1977); Bennett, Policy
Planning in the Netherlands (ch. 6), in INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA, supra note 123.
157. The legislation is at least traceable to the Benthamite-inspired reforms of Chadwick
during the middle of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., the Public Health Acts, 1848, 1872 and 1875.
See also Dicey, The Debt of Collectivism to Benthamism, in LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND
(2d ed. 1962).
158. The legal regime controlling water pollution will soon change (in 1989) with the
privatization of the Regional Water Authorities. Some changes in air pollution law may also take
place to bring the law of the United Kingdom into harmony with European Community law.
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policies, together with the bureaucracies created by them, are encom-
passed within a legal and political tradition characterized by pragma-
tism and incrementalism. Legislation has in general attempted to lo-
cate, contain and control the diverse' problems of pollution within just
one of the media of land, air or water, with apparent disregard of cross-
media implications.
The concept of integration was introduced to the United Kingdom
by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) in
1973. t59 Initially, the RCEP addressed only questions of cross-media
pollution and argued that pollution or wastes generated by an indus-
trial activity could potentially affect water and land, as well as air. In
deciding where pollution should occur, it was sensible that the form and
medium of disposal of pollution should be such as to cause the least
environmental damage overall. A new integrating concept was mooted.
Decisions should be aimed at securing the best practicable environmen-
tal option (BPEO). Such an approach, however, did not find support in
law or administration.160 The RCEP recommended the creation of a
new, unified inspectorate that would undertake an integrated approach
to difficult industrial problems. The RCEP returned to the theme of
BPEO in its tenth and eleventh reports.1 6 ' In its twelfth report, 6 ' it
What is being described in this note is the present law. In brief, serious (usually noncombustible)
air pollution is controlled under the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974, together with the
Alkali etc. Works Regulation Act of 1906. Less serious pollution (usually combustible) is governed
by the Clean Air Acts of 1956 and 1968. Emissions from motor vehicles come within the purview
of the Road Traffic Act of 1972, and the sulfur content of oil fuel used in furnaces is restricted by
the Control of Pollution Act of 1974. Prior to the establishment of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Pollution (HMIP) in 1987, the administration of the laws dealing with serious air pollution was
vested in Her Majesty's Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate (HMIAPI); they have now been
absorbed into HMIP. Noncombustible sources continue to be regulated by local authorities. Wa-
ter pollution is regulated under the Control of Pollution Act of 1974 (COPA). This act is adminis-
tered by statutorily created regional water authorities. The disposal of waste on land is controlled
under the Control of Pollution Act of 1974 and is administered by waste disposal authorities. The
Radioactive Substances Act controls use and disposal of radioactive waste. It was administered
and enforced by a separate inspectorate, now absorbed into HMIP. Commercial nuclear installa-
tions are governed by the Nuclear Installations Act of 1965 and the Nuclear Installations Inspec-
torate. Planning controls under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971 are carried out by
local planning authorities. See THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION ENCYCLOPEDIA (J. Garner ed. 1976 &
Supp. 1989); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLANNING LAW AND PRACTICE (D. Heap ed. 1982 & Supp. 1988); J.
McLOUGHLIN & M. FORSTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM (2d ed. 1982); U.K. DEP'T ENV'T, POLLUTION PAPER No. 9, CONTROL OF POLLU-
TION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: How IT WORKS (1978); A. WALKER, LAW OF INDUSTRIAL POLLU-
TION CONTROL (1980); A. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES (4th ed. 1979),
159. RCEP, No. 5, supra note 1. The RCEP is a prestigious, permanent, national, biparti-
san body which was appointed in 1971 to advise the government of the United Kingdom on ques-
tions of environmental pollution. It has made 12 reports to date, and many of its recommenda-
tions have been adopted.
160. Id. at 264 (by the government of the day).
161. RCEP, Nos. l0 & 11, supra note 1.
162. RCEP, No. 12, supra note I.
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widened the scope of recommended integration. The concern with
cross-media pollution and industrial process was enlarged in principle
to include products, inputs, strategic planning and even national and
international policy.16 The extent to which BPEOs should include
wider strategic considerations was not specified. The recommendations
of the RCEP have been only partially adopted by the British
government. 164
3. THE INTEGRATIVE COMPASS
For our purposes, the British formulation of an integrated ap-
proach (BPEO) raises two important and interconnected questions that
need to be restated before the concept of integration can be satisfacto-
rily implemented. The first concerns the meaning of integration. 1 65 It is
one thing to accept the principle of cross-media pollution, but alto-
gether another to define it. While accepting BPEO in principle, the
United Kingdom made no legislative attempt to define the concept. The
second question, which to a considerable degree subsumes the first, in-
volves the application of the principle. As a concept that seeks to ad-
dress the source rather than the effects of pollution, it is possible to
conceive of integration as extending from treatment and process to
products, and even to grand strategic decisionmaking.
Diagram A1 6 6 illustrates the problem. Suppose that the plant and
process (a point source) consists of a coal burning electric generator,
and that the generator discharges unacceptable levels of sulphur diox-
ide. The plant management proposes to implement flue gas
desulphurization to deal with the problem. One of the desulphurization
technologies envisaged is the application of pulverized limestone which
163. Id. at 2.15, 3.3.
164. After first rejecting it, the Thatcher government in 1987 accepted the proposal for an
unified inspectorate of pollution and named it Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP).
HMIP, however, does not encompass all existing inspectorates and is not based upon a fresh
legislative mandate. U.K. DEP'T ENV'T, HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF POLLUTION (1987). It was
superimposed upon the existing statutory overlay and brought together HMIAPI, the Radiochem-
ical and Hazardous Waste inspectorates, but did not embrace the environmental functions of the
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Health and Safety at Work Executive, or the
Department of Energy. Neither does HMIP include certain other inspectorates. Most importantly,
it has hardly any control over water pollution. See also RCEP, No. 12, supra note I, at 4.6.
Furthermore, HMIP is structured around the separate inspectorates that it has absorbed. This
lack of integration was EPA's problem. The RCEP points out, with characteristic British under-
statement, "current experience of a multi-media approach to pollution control is limited." id. at
4.7.
165. This is almost a universal question. For instance, the Commission of the European
Community, which accepts the need for an integrated approach to pollution control in certain
circumstances, is confronting the difficulties of formulating a concept that could be applied to
achieve its goal. Action Programme, supra note 154, at 3.4.4.
166. See supra Diagram A.
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results in the creation of gypsum-rich sludge waste. Large quantities of
such waste are envisaged. How might the concept of integration be ap-
plied in such a situation? At the strictly operational level, an integrated
approach would accept the fact of such residuals or wastes, and seek to
find the optimal balance for disposing of them, whether to air, land or
water, by the use of a coordinated permit. An extended version of the
approach would evaluate the decision to undertake flue gas
desulphurization within a broader context. Such an inquiry would in-
volve an investigation of the environmental effects of limestone quarry-
ing. What effect would this have on the area from which it is removed,
particularly if limestone is found, say, in a national park? In England, it
is found in areas designated as being of "outstanding natural beauty."
Furthermore, what are the effects of transporting limestone across the
rural countryside, and what are the environmental consequences of
having to store limestone in large quantities? Finally, what is the envi-
ronmental impact of disposing of the sludge created by this particular
technology?
After assessing the environmental impact of the proposed changes,
this version of integration would consider whether a case could be made
for a different method of desulphurization based on an alternative tech-
nology. Although the British government favors the narrow opera-
tional approach, the RCEP seems to favor a broader approach.167 In-
tegration arguably should go further and consider the broader
socioeconomic question as to the acceptability of coal fired generators
and to balance this against alternative power sources, such as nuclear,
solar or wind. Alternatively, it could be asked if generators are neces-
sary at all, when better energy conservation would reduce the need for
electric energy.' 6 ' This line of thinking could be extended much fur-
ther. Most human activities result in the creation of residuals or wastes,
and most social and economic activities could, therefore, have environ-
mental and ecological repercussions. From this perspective, anything
less than comprehensive planning which totally integrates environmen-
tal factors into the decisionmaking and which is based upon environ-
mental considerations, would be inadequate.1
69
The case for an integrated environmental resource strategy has
been cogently argued in the World Conservation Strategy (WCS).' 70
167. U.K. DEP'T ENV'T, supra note 164; RCEP, No. 12, supra note 1, at 2.1.
168. This was the argument in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
169. See J. FORRESTER, WORLD DYNAMICS 123-28 (1981); Norton, Towards a Concept of
Strategic Resource Planning, 4 INT'L J. OF ENVTL. STUD. 189 (1973).
170. International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources-United Na-
tions Environment Programme-World Wildlife Fund, World Conservation Strategy, in 23 INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (B. Ruster & B. Simms eds. 1981).
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Put starkly, WCS warns that an increasing pollution burden, together
with the depletion of vital natural resources and the destruction of criti-
cal ecosystems, cannot continue unabated. It argues that further devel-
opment and progress will depend on how society faces up to the fright-
ening fact that natural resources and ecological processes are being
appropriated for consumption at the same time that they are being
damaged by pollution resulting from the burden of residuals. Any satis-
factory answer to these problems can only be found within the parame-
ters of a strategy which seeks (1) to manage and conserve natural re-
sources so as to extend and prolong their life cycle, (2) to preserve
ecosystems and genetic diversity, and (3) to minimize the impact of pol-
lutants and wastes. The WCS reasons that all of these undertakings
should form part of an integrated strategy.
4. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
It is essential that difficulties about scope and definition, real
though they be, should not be allowed to deflect and delay the imple-
mentation of an integrated approach. The question that confronts us at
this stage is how to arrive at a starting point from which integrated
decisionmaking can commence. What constitutes a sensible beginning
when confronted with so complicated a problem? Since the seemingly
obvious starting points of air, water or land have been rejected, from
where does one start? In applying the principles discussed, there is no
definitive and preordained point from which to begin, but a promising
response is offered by the Conservation Foundation's Draft Environ-
mental Protection Act.171 The Second Draft divides the sources of pol-
lution into mobile sources, point sources, nonpoint sources and sub-
stances and articles. Point sources include the plant and process capable
of producing air, water and solid waste pollution which may hitherto
have been treated separately under air, water and solid waste laws. For
heuristic purposes, point sources offer a good starting point for testing
the practicability and applicability of an integrated analysis. First, the
point sources could be divided according to type of plant-steel and
rolling mills, pulp and paper mills, sugar cane extracting mills, etc. Sec-
ond, a single permit would be issued for each such point source. This
single coordinated permit contrasts with the present practice of issuing
different permits for air, water and solid waste. In setting standards,
EPA would abide by those standards already established under present
171. CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT, SECOND
DRAFT (1988) [hereinafter SECOND DRAFT]. This Second Draft is cited for a very limited purpose. It
should be distinguished from the Draft Act discussed infra at text accompanying notes 279-99.
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legislation, and then try to ensure a balance that would secure the best
practicable environmental option.
The RCEP has proposed an insightful and instructive "procedure"
for the practical implementation of an integrated approach. This "pro-
cedure" will be adapted and developed, as a functional approach, in the
analysis that follows. The advantage of a functional approach to inte-
gration is that it begins with a proposed activity and allows an integra-
tive analysis to be pursued as far as the investigator wants to go. The
integrative bubble placed around the activity can be confined to a point
source. On the other hand, it could be extended to product and input,
and even further to strategic planning and macro socioeconomic policy.
The analysis starts by focusing on the objective of an activity.
Since the objective of most industrial activities is the production of
goods, it seems sensible to begin with the nature of the final product and
raise questions about possible alternatives that might be less polluting.
For example, if the activity is coal-fired generation of electricity, ques-
tions may be raised about the options to the generation of extra electric-
ity. Does a need for more electricity actually exist where better insula-
tion and more careful use of energy could achieve savings equivalent to
the electricity that is to be generated? If the activity is the manufacture
of bright paper that causes considerable pollution, the option of manu-
facturing less bright, non-bleached paper which causes much less pollu-
tion should be considered. An obvious constraint that arises in this con-
text is the extent to which pollution control laws allow for inquiries of
this kind. If the laws do not, attention would shift to the controlling of
process and inputs.
A further objective of an industrial plant or process is the disposal
of the residuals. Such an objective is formulated in the light of, and
within the limits laid down by legal, technical and economic factors. It
is important that further analysis of the objectives pertaining to the
method of disposal precede any final decision. For example, where
residuals consisting of heavy metals, or sludge from crude oil tanks,
need to be disposed of, the objective would be to dispose of residuals in
the most efficient manner within the law rather than to design, locate
and operate a high-temperature incinerator. Such residuals could be
disposed of on land or incinerated. A decision as to the method of
disposal should depend upon the analysis being described. Such an
analysis may reveal that incineration is the most satisfactory method of
disposal, but this should not be prejudged.
The next stage lies in generating options. Such options would be
subject to the existing laws controlling pollution. They would arise
from the canvassing of technologies, plant designs and methods which
create the most environmental benefit at the least cost. For example, the
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most efficient answer to pollution caused by the generation of liquid
residuals containing mercury in the chlor-alkali industry does not lie in
the use of end-of-pipe technologies that attempt to remove the mercury
from waste water. Instead, it is found in employing a different method
of production-a diaphragm, rather than a mercury cell, in the manu-
facturing process."'
The third stage involves an environmental impact assessment of a
short list of options generated by stages one and two. There is a rich
history of experience, literature and case law on section 102(2)(c) of
NEPA' 73 setting out the requirements of environmental impact evalua-
tions, but these will not be replicated here. What is important for the
purposes of this discussion is that any environmental impact assess-
ment should take the cross-media pollution transfers into account. The
nature of cross-media transfers has already been discussed.174
During the fourth stage, ways of reducing the environmental im-
pact of the short list of options will be considered. They will involve a
consideration, inter alia, of (1) the importance of inputs,175 (2) the pos-
sibilities of reclamation of residuals and recycling,176 and (3) changes
to production process in order to reduce waste.17 7 Finally, an overall
172. RCEP, No. 12, supra note 1, at 3.8.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 6 YEARS EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY FEDERAL
AGENCIES (1976); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY- 1981 (1982);
F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973); W. RODGERS, supra note 7, at 697-834; J. BATTLE,
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING AND NEPA (1986).
174. See supra notes 1-50 and accompanying text.
175. This aspect of the matter has already been referred to in the context of the coal
electric industry. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. The same holds true in many other
activities, for example, the steel industry, where the use of raw coke plant liquor causes significant
problems of air pollution. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 26, at 93.
176. The British were fortunate in discovering the virtues of recycling. When the first
Alkali Act was enacted in 1863, hydrogen chloride was being emitted into the atmosphere and was
causing extensive damage to the countryside. It was found that hydrogen chlcride could be con-
verted into commercial bleach. Polluton control was thereby achieved while the industry was
steered into a profitable venture. Hill, The Role of the British Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorate in
Air Pollution Control, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS IN IMPLEMENTING POLLUTION LAWS 89
(1983). United States industrial history also presents numerous examples of successful by-product
development from reclaimed residuals. A few of these include the transformation of slaughter-
house residuals into valuable raw material for the pharmaceutical industry, the developments of
silvi-chemicals based upon materials contained in wood pulping residuals, the production of
animal foods from brewery, distillery and food processing residuals, the use of power plant residu-
als of ash in building materials, the use of textile residuals in paper manufacture, and the produc-
tion of farm fertilizer from ammonium chloride. Similarly, materials in finished goods have been
re-cycled. They include the recovery of lead from batteries, the re-cycling of beer and soda cans,
and, to some degree, the recycling of virtually all metals. Some of these developments are summa-
rized in A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 26, at 45-48; RCEP, No. 12, supra note 1, at 3.11.
177. For example, in steel production, the basic oxygen process results in more than twice
as many particulates per ton as the open hearth and electric arc processes, while also generating
more residuals in general. The introduction of continuous casting on a broad scale will result in a
decrease of residuals. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 26, at 85-92.
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evaluation of the options is undertaken, and the one best befitting an
integrated approach is adopted. The same analysis can be extended to
cover input and strategic planning.
B. Integration and Regulatory Reform
To the extent that integrated thinking converges with the criticism
of "command and control" 7 8 regulation by "regulatory reform-
ers,"' 79 it may be prudent at this juncture to point out that an adventi-
tious convergence of views does not lead to any confluence of conclu-
sions. The indictment of the present system of "command and control"
legislation by regulatory reformers is familiar. It has been argued with
skill and cogency by eminent scholars such as Bruce Ackerman, Ste-
phen Breyer and Richard Stewart. ' 8 0 This Article does not propose to
178. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework,
69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256, 1264 (1981) (describing "command and control" legislation as that which
requires or proscribes specific conduct by regulated firms; this is contrasted with a system of regu-
lation based on economic incentives and price mechanisms).
179. The parent stock of economic analysis has given rise to two interrelated theories, one
doctrinaire, the other pragmatic. The doctrinaire theorists of deregulation argue first that no regu-
latory process can ever be responsive enough to replicate the efficiency of the market, and second
that, in any event, efficient regulation is impossible because regulatory agencies are colonized by
those who pursue their self interest. These doctrinaire theorists conclude, therefore, that adminis-
trative regulation is either completely ineffective or a waste of resources, and they call for deregula-
tion, the abolition of agencies; and a return to the market. See Stigler and Friedland, What Can
Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962); Stigler, The Theory of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); G. STIGLER & M. COHEN, CAN REGULA-
TORY AGENCIES PROTECT THE CONSUMER.'? 1-17 (1971); M. DERTHICK & P. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF
DEREGULATION 9 (1985). The more pragmatic regulatory reformers (e.g., S. BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982)) concede that the unregulated price of goods does not reflect the true
cost to society of producing their goods. The difference between true social costs and unregulated
price arises, for example, when a manufacturer makes use of the air or water to get rid of residuals,
thereby causing harm to others, without paying for the use of such air or water. While problems of
this kind may theoretically be dealt with through private liability rules, the difficulties and draw-
backs of such a scheme have elicited the concession that centralized and specialized administrative
direction may be necessary in dealing with problems of environmental pollution. But such regula-
tion should be market supporting rather than market supplanting. Winter, Economic Regulation
and Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, 82 YALE L.J. 890 (1973). The goal of
regulation should be to correct market failure and formulate agency rules which mimic, as far as
possible, the allocation of goods and services that would be produced in a perfectly competitive
market. For an excellent resume and critique of the arguments based on deregulation and regula-
tory reform, see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1689-93, 1702-11 (1975). See also Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 646, 646-55 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 76, at 446-
52.
180. See Stewart, supra note 178, at 1264; Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mis-
matches, Less Restrictive Alternatives and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REv. 547, 595-97 (1979); B. ACKER-
MAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY 165-207 (1974) [hereinafter UNCERTAIN SEARCH]; Rose-Ackerman, Market
Models for Water Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 PUB. POL'Y 383 (1977); R.
CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR
32-80 (1983); T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY
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review their arguments or those advanced in defense of the present re-
gime in any detailed or systematic fashion. However, a quick distilla-
tion of the central themes of their argument is necessary to demonstrate
that the case for integration is distinct from and independent of the case
made by the regulatory reformers.
To begin with, regulatory reformers often adopt arguments based
on an economic analysis which would have the effect of relaxing the
present controls and allowing market forces to play a key role in envi-
ronmental policy. 181 Those arguments contend that the present con-
trols impose billions of dollars in compliance costs182 and lead to de-
creases in productivity, technological innovation and market
competition. 18 3 They argue that the present uniform standards gov-
erning pollution do not achieve environmental protection at the lowest
cost. Some polluters may have lower abatement costs than others be-
cause of their technological superiority or their favorable physical and
geographical location. These polluters should contribute more towards
achieving a required environmental quality because they could do so at
the least cost. Uniform emission standards apply indiscriminately
across the board and do not differentiate between varying cost capabili-
ties. Therefore, these standards cannot achieve the desired levels of en-
vironmental protection at the lowest cost.' 8 4 Further, such standards
do not consider the true social cost of environmental legislation. The
true social costs will include not only the costs involved in installation,
maintenance and management of pollution controls, but also the "op-
portunity costs" incurred in not deploying the resources required for
pollution control in other profitable ventures such as streamlining the
plant or extending it. Any opportunities for such beneficial investment
are forgone as a result of having to set up pollution controls. ' Finally,
the regulatory reformers fail to provide incentives to improve antipollu-
tion devices. Where a polluter has complied with existing controls, she
has no incentive to further reduce pollution. Indeed, it would be against
her interest to try to do any better. The cure for these deficiencies, urge
the regulatory reformers, lies in more flexible strategies which would
achieve environmental protection on a lowest cost basis and at the same
time provide adequate incentives for improved performance. They also
(1985) (providing bibliographies at the end of each chapter). The development of the reformist
critique is traced in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE ORDER 1-40 (V. Smith
ed. 1984); B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 50.
181. See Stewart, supra note 178.
182. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 50, at 69-84.
183. See, e.g., id. at 59-60, 81-82; S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 115-16, 269-70
(1982); Stewart, supra note 178, at 1259-60, 1279-1306.
184. See S. BREYER, supra note 183, at 264; see also A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note
50.
185. See UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 180.
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urge a system of environmental protection based upon charges and
marketable permits. 186 Such strategies would require paying attention
to the particular circumstances of the polluter and adopting a "fine tun-
ing" approach to regulation. 1
87
It is indeed difficult to read the criticisms and proposals of these
reformers without being impressed by the extent to which their views
coalesce with those of the Reagan Administration, which was intent on
deregulating and dismantling environmental controls. Many of these
critics propose reforming methodologies which involve a quantification
of the costs and benefits of proposed action. It is precisely such an ap-
proach that President Reagan's executive orders formalized by requir-
ing a cost-benefit analysis to the extent permitted by law.' 8 8 This Arti-
cle adopts the positions taken in an impressive and important rejoinder
to the regulatory reformers by Professor Howard Latin. He points out
that after Congress proved unwilling to repeal regulatory legislation,
the Reagan Administration changed tack and argued for a strategy
which was substantially the same as that of the regulatory reformers.
Premised on the grounds of efficiency, that strategy included "fine tun-
ing" and expanded reliance on cost-benefit analysis.' 8 9 Latin warned
that the Administration was well aware that "fine tuning" would sel-
dom work in practice and used "fine tuning" as a means to achieve sub
rosa deregulation. He also demonstrates that the reformers' excessive
preoccupation with ideal or theoretical efficiency blinds them to the
truth that in a "second best" world, the critical issue is not ideal effi-
ciency but actual effectiveness.' 90 It is worth mentioning in this context
that the uniform national standards presently applicable to air and wa-
ter were adopted only after the more flexible and relaxed approach to
pollution control proved ineffective. 91
186. J. BONiNE & T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 637-38 (1984).
187. Stewart, supra note 178, at 1266.
188. Exec. Order No. 12,291,3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-
34 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 138-39
(Supp. V 1985).
189. See Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Stan-
dards and "Fine Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1271-72 (1985).
190. Id.
191. For example, the statutory regimes of national air pollution control carried over
from the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 to the Air Quality Act of 1967 left the control of air
pollution in state hands. The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322
(1955), declared that air pollution control responsibility rested primarily with the states. The fed-
eral role was confined to research. The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392
(1963), declared that its aim was to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution, but left it
virtually to the states to determine what the nature and content of such control should be. Federal
intervention was possible only where air pollution resulted in interstate consequences (id. § 5 (f)),
and required complicated conference procedures (id. § 5), together with a court order based upon
physical and economic feasibility (id. § 5 (g)). The 1963 act left pollution control in state hands.
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The regulatory reformers are, therefore, seeking to turn the clock
back and return to the discredited and demonstrably ineffective kinds
of controls that have been supplanted. Moreover, the bureaucratic
quagmire that would be created by any scheme of charges or transfer-
able pollution rights has been clearly demonstrated.' 92
A central theme common to a number of the reformer propos-
als1 9 3 appears to coalesce with one which lies at the heart of cross-me-
dia pollution control. The regulatory reformers contend that deci-
sionmakers should consider all economic, environmental and control
strategies before devising an efficient system. In order to arrive at the
optimal solution to any environmental problem, they argue, it is neces-
sary to obtain full information about all environmental, economic and
social circumstances, together with full consideration of all possible
strategies.' 94 Latin points out that this may be feasible in an ideal
world, but not in the real "second best" world we inhabit. Obtaining
such information involves both time and money, and time is not some-
thing readily available when there is a need for expeditious action. In
many environmental situations, the consequences of postponing action
until all information becomes available could be very damaging. Risk
assessment is notoriously difficult, and postponing a decision or making
no decision for the reason that the issue is indeterminate promotes in-
terests which benefit polluters.' 95 In many cases, the kind of evaluation
demanded by these reformers is a prescription for procrastination. In-
terrelated to their call for full information and investigation is the de-
mand for more rigorous risk assessment. They require not only that a
particular pollutant be linked with specified harm or injury, but also
The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967), probably represents
the kind of regime favored by the regulatory reformers. It provided, inter alia, for HEW to create
atmospheric areas and air quality regions (id. §§ 107 (a)(l) & 107 (a)(2)) and to issue criteria docu-
ments and reports on pollution control techniques (id. § 107 (b) & (c)). It then required states to
adopt ambient air standards consistent with the criteria and control technique reports (id. § 108
(c)(l)). The nature or scope of such standards was not specified. States were then expected to
develop plans to implement the ambient air quality standards. Such plans would contain emission
standards and timetables for compliance (id. §§ 107 & 108).
Such a statutory scheme gave ample opportunity for market forces and fine tuning. But they
just did not work. The verdict on these efforts is aptly summarized by Rodgers. "... [They were
tried and found wanting .... W. RODGERS, supra note 5, at 245. See also R. Melnick, supra note 2,
at 28; R. TOBIN, supra note 7; J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1975). It was
precisely because of the failure of these earlier legislative schemes that Congress resorted to na-
tional ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970 and 1977. Clean
Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970); Clean Air Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). See also Should NEPA Apply, supra note 101, at 623.
192. Wolozin, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 227, 233-37 (1968).
193. B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, supra note 50, at 72-73.
194. Id. at 60-103; UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 180, at 9-78.
195. Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
89, 92 (1988).
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that particular levels of the implicated pollutant be correlated with mar-
ginal environmental and health effects.' 96 This kind of risk assessment
is a Gargantuan task requiring almost limitless time and resources. It is
almost incapable of fulfillment in a "second best" world.' 9 7
The regulation of pollutants confronts at least four types of uncer-
tainty which stand in the way of scientific certainty or proof.'9 8 They
are data uncertainty, 199 indeterminacy, 20 0 nonrecurring and nonrepli-
196. See, e.g., R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 29, at 360-61; L. LAVE & E. SESKIN, AIR
POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1978); V. SMITH, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AIR POLLU-
TION 174 (1976). In their rejoinder to Latin's article, Ackerman and Stewart claim that they "have
never advocated such an utopian scheme." They go on to propose that Congress, and not adminis-
trators, should specify the rates of reduction, in percentile terms, of existing pollutants. They admit
that this would require Congress to "guess about countless contestable matters." Ackerman &
Stewart, supra note 100, at 1352-55. It is difficult to see how guessing by Congress, which does not
possess any special expertise in these matters, could be preferred to that of EPA, which would be in
a far superior position to undertake such a task. The crux of the matter is that the reformers object
to the "unguided" decisions of EPA precisely because they are not based upon sufficient informa-
tion and satisfactory risk evaluation. That criticism is clearly blunted by their admission that the
decisions they would now leave to Congress would be equally "unguided." Specialized agencies
were created because Congress lacked the kind of expertise demanded to implement the reformers
proposals. Indeed, Stewart himself has questioned whether "a legislature is likely in many in-
stances to generate more responsible decisions on questions of policy than agencies," arguing that
while administrative agencies have been criticized as unduly responsive to wealth and to organized
interests, such criticisms might equally be applied to Congress. Stewart, supra note 179, at 1696.
The position now taken by Ackerman and Stewart is a major concession to the impracticability of
the kind of risk evaluation they espouse.
197. Latin, supra note 189, at 1274; Gamse, Economic Analysis and Environmental Regu-
lations, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT MANDATED COSTS 134-36 (R. Lanzillotti ed. 1978).
198. See Rodgers, Guerilla Decisionmaking: Judicial Review of Risk Assessments, 15 J.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 205, 206-10 (1987) (Rogers describing the four types of uncertainty).
199. The decisionmaker lacks the facts to make a considered decision. The data shortages
include unknowns about groups exposed, routes of exposure, patterns and practices of uses, be-
havior of chemicals within the environment, and their effects on human beings.
200. Indeterminacy arises out of attempts to answer questions that have no answer. Inde-
terminate questions include the shape of the dose-response curve, the relevance of animal studies,
the relationship of exposures to effects observed in epidemiological studies, and even whether there
are safe threshold levels for exposures to given substances. For example, EPA has stated that no
reliable threshold above zero can be identified for carcinogenic risk. National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedure for Identifying, Assessing and Regulating
Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,660 (1979). And further, the
agency has stated that "in every quantitative risk estimation.., the results are uncertain." Guide-
lines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992, 33,997 (1986). These conclusions
flow from the fact that the causal relationship between a chemical and cancer is often difficult to
establish, partly because of incomplete knowledge concerning the manner in which a chemical
carcinogen acts on human cells and also because there is uncertainty as to whether the human
body has some defensive mechanism against the carcinogenic reaction. Evidence of carcinogenesis
in humans usually arises from epidemiological studies of occupational groups that have high expo-
sure to a given chemical. However, extrapolations to the general public from this data are unrelia-
ble because humans are exposed to a variety of other substances at low levels. To try and overcome
this difficulty, rodents are used in laboratory testing. Unfortunately, small risks are difficult to
detect in rodents, and assumptions that the dose-response relationships in rodents apply equally to
humans is fiercely contested. Because carcinogenic dose-response relationships cannot be directly
determined at low exposure levels either by epidemiologic studies or studies on animals, numerous
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cable events,2"' and transcientific policy questions."' Eventually,
these uncertainties can be combatted only by policy choices20 a based
upon the psychological, political and legal acceptability of a given
risk,2° 4 rather than upon alleged scientific judgment. The fallacies be-
hind the view that the risk-assessment process is a scientific activity
have been strikingly and cogently exposed.20 5 Latin has demonstrated
how inadequate scientific knowledge and inadequate data usually pre-
vent derivation of risk estimates based on reliable science, while the
illusion that risk assessment is a purely scientific activity hides the polit-
ical and policy judgments on which such risk assessment is based.20 6 It
is quite clear that an integrated approach does require some form of
risk evaluation, but the crucial point that needs emphasis is that such
risk evaluation is too important and too uncertain to be left exclusively
to risk assessors who hide their policies and politics behind a facade of
207science.
mathematical models have been developed to extrapolate from high to low dosages. Alas, no sin-
gle mathematical procedure is recognized as the most appropriate for low-dose extrapolation in
carcinogenesis. Id.; Bond, Causality of a Given Cancer After Known Radiation Exposure, in
HAZARDS: TECHNOLOGY AND FAIRNESS 24 (National Academy of Engineering 1986). See generally
Latin, The Significance of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncer-
tainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1982); Latin, The Feasibility of Occupational Health Standards: An
Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 583 (1983); Latin, supra
note 195; Note, Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Section 112 of the
Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612 (1988).
201. Predicting nonrecurring events introduces us to the realm of the indeterminate.
Apart from indeterminacies, there are information barriers unique to understanding events that
come around but once. For example, the chemistry and impact of the mixtures at many of the
waste disposal sites are not duplicable, and they leave in their wake unanswerable questions about
causes and effects. See generally S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTES IN
AMERICA (1982).
202. These are high policy questions that may be asked of science, but are not answerable
by science. See Weinberg, Science and its Limits: The Regulator's Dilemma, in HAZARDS: TECHNOL-
OGY AND FAIRNESS, supra note 200, at 9.
203. Latin, supra note 195, at 133-34.
204. Rodgers lists these controlling considerations as including voluntariness, cata-
strophic nature, comparability to natural risks, universality (e.g., the widespread dissemination of
PCBs, DDT and lead), government sponsorship (e.g., swine flu), vulnerability of the target group,
necessity (e.g., fluorocarbon), familiarity of the risk, and immediacy of anticipated effects and de
minimis nature. He points out that these indicators may be in conflict at times, but they offer
surprisingly convincing explanations of a number of well-known policy decisions. Rodgers, supra
note 198, at 210.
205. Latin, supra note 195; Rodgers, supra note 198.
206. Latin, supra note 195, at 89-95.
207. Id. at 90. In what one hopes will not prove to be a regressive move, the Integrated
Environmental Management Program (IEMP) of EPA has pioneered the use of quantitative risk
analysis as an integrating methodology and has, according to Davis, "educated a large number of
people about risk assessment and risk management." Davis, The United States: Experimentation
and Fragmentation (ch. 3), in INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
supra note 123. The kind of risk assessment ostensibly based on good science which estimates
health hazards at varying exposure levels is now embodied in EPA's guidelines for estimating
carcinogenic hazards. Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, supra note 200. Risk assess-
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Accordingly, the integrative analysis of risk advocated in this Arti-
cle is intended to encourage and induce tighter and more effective envi-
ronmental controls to remedy the defects of existing regimes. Since it is
based on the premise that those controls already in place will remain
intact, it is not a vehicle for avoiding or relaxing existing controls,
though there is the possibility that the nature and wisdom of some of
the existing controls may need to be reconsidered. The integrative anal-
ysis advocated here is based upon several grounds. First, the failure
scientifically to find or prove an effect cannot lead to the conclusion that
there is no effect.2"' Latin has pointed out, and Ackerman and Stewart
have accepted,20 9 that the costs of obtaining all relevant information
about all possible effects of pollutants are prohibitive. Second, risk as-
sessment is as much a political as a scientific evaluation. 210 The primary
purpose of a regulatory agency is to achieve the goals set out in its stat-
ute, and an agency's mission should not be paralyzed by the complexi-
ties of scientific uncertainty. Latin points out that Congress has often
recognized the uncertainty associated with toxic hazards and nonethe-
less required agencies to impose effective regulatory controls.21 t The
position that "a 'political' agency law-making process is more func-
tional and wise in the long run than a 'technocratic' process," and
should therefore be preferred to the latter, has a well-established pedi-
gree in administrative law.2 12 Not surprisingly, the view that decisions
made on the basis of public perception of risk, in the absence of quanti-
fiable scientific proof, are not irrational has been gaining acceptance. It
has been firmly endorsed by the British Royal Commission on Environ-
mental Pollution.21 3
ment is seen as anterior to and supposedly independent of the political activity of risk management
which balances competing interests and values to determine whether identified toxic risks should
be considered acceptable or tolerable.
208. Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207,
230-33 (1978).
209. Supra note 196.
210. See supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text. See also ROYAL SOCIETY, RISK As-
SESSMENT (1983); Slovic, Fischoff& Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT: How SAFE Is SAFE ENOUGH? (R. Shilling & A. Albers eds. 1980);
Otway, The Perception of Technological Risks: A Psychological Perspective, in TECHNOLOGICAL
RISK (M. Dierkes, S. Edwards & R. Coppock eds. 1980); Otway & Thomas, Reflection on Risk
Perception and Policy, in 2 RISK ANALYSIS 2 (1982); K. SHRADER-FRECHETrE, RISK ANALYSIS AND
SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1985).
211. Latin, The Significance of Toxic Health Risks, supra note 200, at 381-82. For exam-
ple, the Occupational Safety and Health Act's legislative history recorded that despite scientific
uncertainty, "it is not intended that the Secretary be paralyzed by debate surrounding diverse
medical opinions." SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HEARING ON THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 848 (1971).
212. See, e.g., A. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 9 (1986).
213. RCEP, No. 10, supra note l, at 11.
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Unfortunately, the regulatory reformers and economic analysts
have succeeded in stealing the mantle of "rationality." By giving deci-
sionmakers supposedly objective numbers derived from markets, and a
way of using them in cost-benefit analysis, the economic approach ap-
pears to be more rational than the subjective values or judgments of
administrators.214 This Article accepts the need to move from "incre-
mentalism" to "comprehensive rationality,"2 5 but rejects the view that
such a development should be based upon economic analysis.216 The
"comprehensive rationality" advocated in these pages is premised upon
the principle that the policymaker must promote only those goals speci-
fied by the politically responsible legislature. 217 The objective and pur-
pose of administrative action is to realize these goals in a manner con-
sistent with the publicly articulated purpose of the statute. It is not to
re-balance them against the criteria of economic analysis, and emphati-
cally not to substitute the goal of economic efficiency. A number of our
environmental laws emphasize ethical over economic values insofar as
they aim to protect health, safety and environmental quality, rather
than to make markets more efficient or to maximize consumer surplus
or social wealth.21 8 Consistent with these views, "comprehensive ra-
tionality" is seen as the framework within which administrators should
seek the public good as embodied in the goals of legislation.219
214. For a useful analysis, see Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and
Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
215. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 396-
99, 409-34 (1981).
216. See infra notes 368-72 and accompanying text.
217. Diver, supra note 215. See also B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921) (judges should interpret statutes by starting with the language and reaching a decision that
applies that language to a particular set of facts in a way consistent with the publicly articulated
purpose of the statute; judges ought not to look beyond the legislature's stated purpose in inter-
preting statutes). Pari passu, the same principles should apply to administrators.
218. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE
L.J. 1537, 1566-90 (1983). According to Stewart, "[m]ost environmental statutes explicitly endorse
the promotion of non-commodity values such as wilderness preservation and health protection."
Id. at 1584. Stewart places his ideas within liberal theory that first asserts the equal right of each
individual to pursue his or her own conception of the good, and second, affirms governmental
neutrality, and bars government from using its power in a manner so as to advance some citizen's
particular concept of the good. Stewart justifies the advancement of non-commodity environmen-
tal values on the grounds that liberalism recognizes the need to develop in individuals a critical
capability with respect to their preferences that enables them to expand and enrich their existing
concepts of the good. Such a critical capability, he argues, is central to the supreme value of indi-
vidual self-determination; without it, one can hardly be said to choose one's own ends. Id. at 1567.
He concludes that wealth maximization based on economic analysis is not consistent with liberal
principles. "It is instead a form of tyranny that would impose on individuals a partial sectarian
concept of the good. Liberal principles demand that regulation cultivate non-commodity values."
Id. at 1569. See also Sagoff, Where Ickes Went Right or Reason and Rationality in Environmental
Law, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 272-73 (1987).
219. While it is not intended to canvass theories of administrative decisionmaking, some
reference to them is unavoidable. The approach favored by this Article is based upon the "republi-
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The goals embodied in legislation need not necessarily reflect or
follow public concern and preference. The legislation can also create
and lead public opinion. In so doing, legislation performs a "teaching"
function.22 ° Professor Joseph Sax highlights the educative role of law
when he likens statutes protecting the environment to museums, librar-
ies, public television and education which attempt to improve popular
culture and taste. 22' Economic analysis seeks to subvert this teaching.
function of the law, but "comprehensive rationality" does not. Any
move from a fractured and fragmented system to an integrated one
should be wedded and faithful to the goals of Congress.
C. Integration Institutionalized
1. THE ECOLOGICAL ROOTS
An integrated approach to environmental problems is deeply em-
bedded in ecological and 'holistic' pathways of thinking which view the
environment as an integrated and interconnected whole. A rich vein of
literature bears witness to this thinking.222 It is illustrated forcefully by
two books that had an enormous impact on the thinking of an earlier
era. In 1962, Rachel Carson's Silent Spring223 showed that pollution is
more than an aesthetic problem and constitutes a threat to the complex
processes of life. The book was premised upon an holistic understand-
ing of the environment. More important, for the purposes of this dis-
cussion, Barry Commoner's apocalyptic Closing Circle, published in
1971, made the case for an holistic view of the "ecosphere" even more
directly and powerfully. Indeed, his first law of ecology was that
can" concept of administration and government. The "republican" theory of government argues
that legislation should rise above "clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public
good." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (S. Mittell ed. 1938). To this limited extent, the
Article does not subscribe to "pluralist" theories of government, which support economic analy-
sis. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Reich,
Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE. L.J. 1617 (1985).
See also infra text accompanying notes 357-72.
220. W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 133 (2d ed. 1978).
221. J. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS 50-52 (1980).
222. See E. KORMONDY, CONCEPTS OF ECOLOGY (2d ed. 1976); E. KORMONDY, READINGS
IN ECOLOGY (1965); P. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN, HUMAN ECOLOGY: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
(1973); S. BRUBAKER, To LIVE ON EARTH: MAN AND His ENVIORNMENT IN PERSPECTIVE (1972); C.
PURCELL, FROM CONSERVATION To ECOLOGY (1973); R. NASH, THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT:
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF CONSERVATION (1968); L. CALDWELL, ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE
TO MODERN SOCIETY (1970); L. CALDWELL, MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT: POLICY AND ADMINIS-
TRATION (1975); AMERICA'S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (R. Revelle & H. Landsberg eds. 1967); W.
o OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: PROLOGUE TO A POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
STEADY STATE (1977).
223. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
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"Everything is Connected to Everything Else," '2 24 and his second was
that "Everything Must Go Somewhere." '22 5 His illustration of these
principles demonstrated the extent to which we are compelled to treat
the environment as a whole and are barred from reducing it to "a set of
separate simple events." '2 2 6 The ecological thinking of the era was com-
plemented by those of various policy analysts. Allen Kneese, Blair
Bower, and their colleagues, for instance, focused on the flow of materi-
als from the environment to the economy and the return flow of these
materials back to the environment as wastes or residuals. They devel-
oped a model to provide a comprehensive view of the environment and
the economy and concluded that air, water and solid waste pollution
could not be considered separate unrelated problems.227
The early influence of these ideas motivated legislative attempts,
which began ten years before NEPA, to unify conservation, resource
and environmental policy.228 Then, in 1968, an important report of the
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics, entitled Managing the Envi-
ronment, implicated fragmented governmental decisionmaking with
the country's environmental problems and recommended that a na-
tional policy for the environment be adopted.229 The need for integra-
tion was also reflected in the even more important Congressional White
Paper on a National Policy for the Environment.23 °
224. B. COMMONER, supra note 8, at 33.
225. Id. at 39.
226. Id. at 21. One of his examples is every bit as telling today.
A dry-cell battery containing mercury is purchased, used to the point of exhaus-
tion, and then 'thrown out'. But where does it really go? First it is placed in a container of
rubbish; this is collected and taken to an incinerator. Here the mercury is heated; this
produces mercury vapor which is emitted by the incinerator stack, and mercury vapor is
toxic. The mercury vapor is carried by the wind, eventually brought to earth in rain or
snow. Entering a mountain lake, let us say, the mercury condenses and sinks to the bot-
tom. Here it is acted on by bacteria which convert it to methyl mercury. This is soluble
and taken up by fish; since it is not metabolized, the mercury accumulates in the organs
and flesh of fish. The fish is caught and eaten by a man and the mercury becomes depos-
ited in his organs, where it might be harmful.
Id. at 40.
227. See A. FREEMAN, R. HAVEMEN & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY (1973); B. BOWER, G. LARSON, A. MICHAELS & W. PHILLIPS, WASTE MANAGEMENT: GENER-
ATION AND DISPOSAL OF SOLID, LIQUID AND GASEOUS WASTE IN THE NEW YORK REGION, A REPORT
OF THE SECOND REGIONAL PLAN (1968). This approach was more definitively set out in A. KNEESE &
B. BowER, supra note 26.
228. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 4 (1973).
229. HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT, 90th Cong., 2D
Sess., MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print 1968).
230. SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE 0
ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, 90th Cong. 2D Sess., CONGRESSIONAL WHITE PAPER ON A NA-
TIONAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (Comm. Print 1968).
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2. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
2 3 1
NEPA was the outcome of two bills, one introduced in the House
by Congressman John Dingell 23 2 and the other introduced in the Sen-
ate by the architect of NEPA, Senator Jackson.2 33 Professor Lynton
Caldwell acted as consultant for Jackson and his committee. The writ-
ings of both Jackson and Caldwell testify to their commitment to inte-
gration.234 Jackson felt that the legislative responses to the environ-
mental problems in the 1960s were sporadic and uncoordinated and
that NEPA provided "both a conceptual basis and a legal sanction" for
a more coordinated and systematic method of dealing with environ-
mental problems. 235 He also noted that in order to produce a truly
integrated and national environmental policy, bills had been intro-
duced to establish a national environmental policy institute, a Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, and a national land use policy.
236
Unhappily, the legislative history of NEPA does not all point in
the direction of integration. To begin with, although Jackson was
clearly impressed with the need for integration, neither his bill2 3, nor
Dingell's bill 238 mentioned integrated environmental policies or even a
national environmental policy. Apparently, both Jackson and Dingell
were trying to avert a turf battle over committee jurisdiction. Jackson
had to deal with Senator Muskie, chairman of the influential Subcom-
mittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public
Works, which sponsored air and water pollution legislation. For his
part, Dingell had to contend with Congressman Wayne Aspinall, chair-
man of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, who eventu-
ally emerged as one of NEPA's strongest opponents.23 9
231. The tortuous journey involved before a bill becomes law, together with the various
procedural steps referred to in parts of this Article, is succinctly discussed in W. KEEFE & M. OGUL,
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 35 (6th ed. 1985).
232. H.R. 6750, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 45 CONG. REc. 3415 (1969).
233. S. 1075, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 45 CONG. REc. 19,008 (1969).
234. In his book ENVIRONMENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY, Professor Caldwell
has a section entitled "Environmental Management as Applied Science." L. CALDWELL, ENViRON-
mENT: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN SOCIETY 163-232 (1970). In it, he argues that there had, until
recently, been no perceived need for general or comprehensive policies of environmental adminis-
tration and control, and that management had extended only to specific aspects of the environ-
ment. Id. at 163. He notes, however, that an ecologically based environmental policy should be
characterized by comprehensiveness of policy and control and operative arrangements. Indeed, his
whole book is premised upon the analogue of a "spaceship earth" which depends for its survival
upon coordinated and interrelated systems.
235. Jackson, Environmental Policy and the Congress, 11 NAT. RES. J. 403, 407 (1971).
236. Id. at411-13.
237. S. 1075, supra note 233.
238. H.R. 6750, supra note 232.
239. F. ANDERSON, supra note 228, at 5. See also Should NEPA Apply, supra note 101, at




Important amendments made to the Senate bill during its hearings
before Jackson's Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reflect the
politics encompassing the bill.24 ° Some of the most significant amend-
ments were made because of Caldwell's promptings. 241 These amend-
ments incorporated the concept of environmental impact assess-
ments.24 2 For his part, Muskie succeeded in obtaining amendments
before the Senate forwarded the bill to a conference committee. The
apparent thrust of his amendments was to ensure that air and water
standards set under legislation being drafted by his subcommittee, or
falling within its jurisdiction, would not be affected by NEPA. Section
104 of NEPA sought to achieve Muskie's objectives. 241 It was ambigu-
ously worded and did not plainly and clearly support Muskie's objec-
tive that air and water pollution legislation should be exempted from
NEPA.244 As Judge Leventhal concluded in Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus,2 4 5 "[t]here is no express exemption in the language of the
Act or Committee Reports."' 246 An attempt to remedy this ambiguity
had been made at the last minute when the conference report on NEPA
reached the Senate floor. Jackson introduced a document interpreting
the act into the Congressional Record to exempt environmentally pro-
tective federal activities from NEPA obligations. 24 7 That document
stated that section 102248 was aimed primarily at "those agencies who
240. In the House, the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, reported out a "clean bill" which was prac-
tically identical to the original House bill. F. ANDERSON, supra note 228, at 6. See also Environmen-
tal Quality: Hearings on H.R. 6750 et al., Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conserva-
tion of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
241. F. ANDERSON, supra note 228, at 6. See also J. BONIE & T. MCGARITY, supra note
186, at 6-7.
242. Caldwell's testimony lead to inclusion of action-forcing provisions. The bill contain-
ing those provisoins was passed on July 10, 1969. F. ANDERSON, supra note 228, at 6 (citing 115
Cong. Rec. 19,008-13 (1969)).
243. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1982). "Noth-
ing in Section 102 or 103 shall in any way affect the specific statutory obligations of any Federal
agency (1) to comply with criteria or standards of environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or
consult with any other Federal or State agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent
upon the recommendations or certification of any other Federal or State agency."
244. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 228, at 8 (citing 115 CONG. REC. 29,046-63, 29,066-99,
40,923-28, 116 CONG. REC. 8984). See also Should NEPA Apply, supra note 101, at 600-02 (discuss-
ing NEPA's "nebulous legislative history" in contrast to its "clear statutory directive").
245. 486 F.2d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
246. Id. n.20 (citing S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H. REP. No. 765, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess. (1969)).
247. F. ANDERSON, supra note 228, at 106. See also 115 CONG. REC. 40,417 (1969); Com-
ment, Landmark Decision on the National Environmental Policy Act in Calvert Cliff's Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, I ENVTL. L. REP. 10,125 (1971).
248. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). Section
102 places a duty on "all agencies of the Federal Government..." (emphasis added) to prepare
environmental impact statements in "every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
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now have little or no legislative authority to take environmental consid-
erations into account," '249 and that section 103250 "is aimed at those
agencies which have little or no authority to consider environmental
values."-25 ' While this may have lent support to Muskie's views, the
same document went on to say that section 102 was "clearly designed to
assure consideration of environmental matters by all agencies in their
planning and decision making."' 25 2 Muskie, commenting on the state-
ment introduced by Jackson, stated that the clear understanding be-
tween Jackson and himself was that sections 102 to 105 of NEPA did
not change the legislative mandates of agencies having environmental
protection duties. 253 Whatever the nature of this understanding be-
tween Jackson and Muskie, it was not formalized in any statement in
the conference report, and as Senator Allott, a member of the Interior
and Conference committees, said, "[O]nly the conference report itself
was signed by all the Senate conferees, and therefore, only it was agreed
upon and is binding." '254 In like vein, Judge Skelly Wright observed in
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm.:
2 5 5
This rather meager legislative history, in our view, cannot rad-
ically transform the purport of the plain words of Section 104.
Had the Senate sponsors fully intended to allow a total abdi-
cation of NEPA responsibilities in water quality matters-
rather than a supplementing of them by strict obedience to the
specific standards of Water Quality Improvement Act
(WQIA)-the language of Section 104 could easily have been
changed.256
Citing the United States Supreme Court, Judge Skelly Wright also
stated that "the legislative history of a statute (particularly such rela-
tively meager and vague history as we have here) cannot radically affect
249. 115 CONG. REC. 40,418 (1969).
250. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1982). Section
103 directs all agencies of the federal government to bring their policies and procedures into full
compliance with NEPA.
251. 115 CONG. REC. 40,418 (1969).
252. Id. On a subsequent occasion when the amendments to the Federal Water Polluton
Control Act were being debated, Jackson concluded that EPA should not be exempt from NEPA.
118 CONG. REc. 33,709 (1972).
253. 115 CONG. REC. 40,423 (1969).
254. Id. at 40,422.
255. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In this case, petitioners argued that the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) failed to consider environmental matters to the extent required by
NEPA when the AEC had passed new rules. The AEC contended that the rules were within the
broad scope of NEPA.
256. Id. at 1126.
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its interpretation if the language of the statute is clear." '257 Indeed, sec-
tion 102 states quite explicitly and unambiguously that it applies to "all
agencies of the Federal Government."2 '
While it is not proposed to second guess their intentions, the inter-
ventions of Jackson and Muskie are perhaps best understood as an at-
tempt to protect the "turf" of committee jurisdiction rather than an
attempt to strike at the integrative functions of NEPA.259 In any event,
this legislative history, which was concerned and indeed was confined to
the applicability of NEPA to air and water controls, could not have
been directed at the then unborn EPA. When it was created, EPA
clearly had an authority which extended beyond air and water.
3. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Six months after the enactment of NEPA, President Nixon estab-
lished two new agencies by executive order. They were EPA 26" and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).26 1 In es-
tablishing the two agencies, President Nixon made the case for control-
ling cross-media pollution in a persuasive, succinct and cogent manner.
The notion of comprehensive management and integration clearly un-
dergirded the creation of EPA and was based upon the ecological ideas
and concepts referred to above.2 6 2 President Nixon observed that since
257. Id.
258. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1982).
259. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
260. For text of plan, see MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., REORGANIZATION
PLAN No. 3, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 364, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The five major programs
moved to EPA were (1) water pollution, which had formerly been carried out by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration in the Interior Department; (2) air pollution, formerly executed
by the National Air Pollution Control Administration in HEW;. (3) solid waste management,
drinking water quality and radiological health, also from HEW; (4) pesticides regulation and re-
search from the Food and Drug Administration and the Agriculture Department; and (5) ambient
standard setting for radiation from the Atomic Energy Commission. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 28, at 25;
261. For the text of the plan, see MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., REORGANIZA-
TION PLAN No. 4, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 365, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). For further information
on the reorganization plans, see MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RELATIVE
To REORGANIZATION PLANS 3 and 4 of 1970, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 366, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970);
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, APPROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 3 OF 1970,
H.R. REP. No. 1464, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); COMMITnTE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, AP-
PROVING REORGANIZATION PLAN No. 4 OF 1970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Reorganization Plans
Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, Hearings Before Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization and Government
Research, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 222-30. While Nixon's commitment to environ-
mental protection may be open to some doubt, it seems reasonably clear that his approach
towards integration was consistent with his beliefs. He believed that government should be organ-
ized around functions (overriding existing divisions) rather than around programs (based on ex-
isting sectoral legislation). His Administration made efforts to coordinate programs in a number
of policy areas. See Palmer, The Evolution of Grant Policies, in THE CHANGING POLITICS OF FED-
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environmental problems should be "perceived as a single, interrelated
system," the then existing piecemeal federal efforts were inappropri-
ate.2 63 A consolidation of anti-pollution activities into one agency,
therefore, "would help assure that we do not create new environmental
problems in the process of controlling existing ones." '264 He hoped that
by combining under one roof programs previously housed in several
separate agencies, the government would be able to "mount an effec-
tively cdordinated campaign against environmental degradation in all
of its many forms." '265 Furthermore, President Nixon noted that
despite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the envi-
ronment must be perceived as a single interrelated system....
A single source may pollute the air with smoke and chemicals,
the land with solid wastes, and a river or lake with chemicals
and other wastes. Control of the air pollution may produce
more solid wastes which then pollute the land or water. Con-
trol of the water-polluting effluent may convert it into solid
wastes which must be disposed of on land .... A far more
effective approach to pollution control would: [i]dentify pollu-
tants; [t]race them through the entire ecological chain, observ-
ing and recording changes in form as they occur; [d]etermine
the total exposure of man and his environment; [e]xamine in-
teractions among forms of pollution; and [i]dentify where in
the ecological chain interdiction would be most
appropriate.26 6
He returned to this theme in his first report to Congress on the state of
the nation's environment, stressing how the setting up of EPA would
consolidate the fragmented responsibilities of various pollution control
agencies. He emphasized again that "[a]ir pollution, water pollution
and solid wastes are different forms of a single problem" and that it was
ERAL GRANTS 5, 24-25 (L. Brown, K. Palmer & J. Fosset eds. 1984); Whitaker, Striking a Balance;
Environment and Natural Resource Policy, in THE NIXON-FORD YEARS 46 (1976). See also B. RABE,
supra note 1, at 15.
Moreover, during congressional hearings on NEPA, Nixon had issued an executive order
establishing an interagency Council on Environmental Quality, which had broad responsibilities
for coordinating federal environmental policy. See Exec. Order No. 11,472, 34 Fed. Reg. 8693
(1969), amendedby, Exec. Order No. 11,514,35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970); Exec. Order No. 12,007,42
Fed. Reg. 42,839 (1977), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321, app. at 507 (1982). Alfred Marcus has
concluded that the Nixon Administration's commitment to administrative integration was in fact
based upon ecological thinking. A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at 31-32.
263. Environmental Protection Agency and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, The President's Message to the Congress Upon Transmitting Reorganization Plans to
Establish the Two Agencies, July 9, 1970, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 908 (JULY 13, 1970).
264. Id. at 911.
265. Id. at 912.
266. Message of the President Relative to Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970,
July 9, 1970, reprinted in FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 295.
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evident that a different approach was necessary. He felt that reorgani-
zation under EPA together with the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ), which the President charged with coordinating all environmen-
tal quality programs,267 would now make this possible.268
Unfortunately, as we have seen,2 6 9 EPA has not lived up to its
expectations. It has not yet become an integrated agency, remaining
half programmatic and half functional, and has been unable to adopt
or implement an integrated approach.
IV. THE NEXT STEPS
We see an emerging picture in which promising integrative initia-
tives have been smothered by a variety of forces. The reasons for the
dominance of fragmentation over integration, as we have noted, 270 in-
cluded disillusionment with administrative expertise and management
that gave rise to rule-specific statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the
Clean Water Act. We also observed the perceived need to act quickly
and effectively when confronted with an urgent problem without wait-
ing for more comprehensive analysis, together with congressional and
presidential politics, and bureaucratic and organizational difficulties.
Despite these difficulties, the need for an integrated approach has be-
come unquestionably stronger in light of the environmental problems
confronting us. Not surprisingly, a number of influential and concerned
voices have been calling for an integrated approach.
Integrated controls have been advocated by academic commenta-
tors,2 7 1 governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations
and even by EPA. The Council on Environmental Quality, which was
established by NEPA to develop and advise the president on national
environmental policy2 72 and to oversee federal action subject to
NEPA, 273 has advocated the concept in recent reports. In a 1983 re-
port, CEQ stated: "Perhaps the most disturbing weakness of the envi-
ronmental programs of the 1970s was their piecemeal approach to envi-
ronmental protection, an approach that failed to recognize that the
environment, by definition, is an integrated whole that must be pro-
267. The CEQ also stressed the need for integration and coordination in its first report.
Id. at 24-27.
268. Id. at viii.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 116-47.
270. See supra Part II.
271. See Rehbinder & Stewart, Environmental Protection Policy, in 2 INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW 1-13 (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J. Weiler eds. 1985); B. RABE, supra note 1.
General support from a different analytical perspective and with different objectives from those
being offered in this Article, is found among a wide variety of writers sharing an economic perspec-
tive. See supra note 180.
272. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 204(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4344(1) (1982).
273. Id. §§ 202, 204(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344(3).
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tected comprehensively."' 4 A later CEQ report reiterated the theme
that "[a]ll parts of the environment are in some way connected, and it
follows that the control of pollution should be integrated across pro-
gram and disciplinary lines, so as to increase the efficiency of control
from a whole-environment perspective and to prevent the unwanted
transfer of pollutants from medium to medium." 275 In the course of
formulating a basis for a more effective and efficient environmental pol-
icy, the first principle adopted by CEQ was that "[e]nvironmental pro-
tection policy must recognize the interconnectedness of the environ-
ment and emphasize multimedia approaches to pollution control."
2 7 6
EPA, too, has begun to move towards an integrated approach.
2 77
The immediate past administrator, Lee Thomas, expressed his commit-
ment to the concept unequivocally:
Surely that is what is needed. Surely that is what environ-
mentalists want. If the Environmental Protection Agency is
ever going to live up to its name in the fullest sense, if it is ever
274. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 7 (1983).
275. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 16TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 12 (1985).
276. Id. at 20.
277. The first significant step in the direction of integration was taken in 1978 when Ad-
ministrator Costle appointed a "Task Force on EPA Permits Consolidation." The Task Force
cryptically accepted that its long range and ultimate goal was that of "regulating pollutants of
concern through all phases of air, water and solid waste cycles," but concluded that such a task
was beyond its scope. C. Sellars, The Rise and Fall of the Consolidated Permit Program-A Case
Study of Reform Within the EPA (1984) (unpublished paper submitted to the Conservation Foun-
dation). Costle's initiative led to a consolidated permit program that was later deconsolidated by
the Reagan Administration. Administrator Costle took a second step in 1980 when he created a
new Integrated Environmental Management Program (IEMP) in the Office of Policy Planning and
Evaluation. In mid-1981, IEMP submitted a report to the new Administrator, Anne Gorsuch.
Anne Gorsuch is notorious for her virulent anti-regulatory position. Taking over what was gener-
ally recognized as a comparatively efficient organization in May, 1981, she departed EPA in 1983
after an acrimonious tenure, leaving EPA, in the words of incoming Administrator Ruckelshaus,
"on the verge of spinning out of control." Davies, Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Ad-
ministration in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA 143-60 (N. Vig &
M. Kraft eds. 1984). The IEMP report recommended the institutionalization of toxics integration.
The report was rejected by Gorsuch, and IEMP lay moribund until the end of 1982. It was then
resurrected to undertake integrated studies of pollution control applicable to particular industries
and particular geographic areas. The industry studies produced a "few interesting results" but for
the most part failed to change EPA policy. The geographic studies are still ongoing. The focus of
these studies is no longer to change the way EPA thinks so much as to educate state and local
pollution control officials. A relatively new stimulus to an integrated approach was provided in the
mid 1980s by the focus on waste reduction, and in 1988 EPA established an Office of Pollution
Prevention separated from existing media programs. It is too early to evaluate the effect of this
office on an integrated approach to pollution control. See generally Davis, The United States:
Experiment and Fragmentation, in INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL IN EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA, supra note 123. See also Aim, The EPA's Approach to Cross-media Problems, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 1, at 7-13 (1985) (discussing proceedings of a conference held at Wash-
ington, D.C., Nov. 13, 1984).
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going to become more than a holding company for single me-
dium programs, we are going to have to re-examine the roots
of environmental policy.
27 8
The appointment of William Reilly as administrator of EPA by Presi-
dent Bush may indicate a striking new development for that agency.
Reilly is the immediate past president of the Conservation Foundation,
whose proposal for an integrated environmental act may assume even
greater significance. This section will first consider the Conservation
Foundation proposal and then moot a different, less ambitious, but ar-
guably more practical strategy for implementing an integrated
approach.
A. The Conservation Foundation Proposal
The Conservation Foundation has been prominent among non-
governmental, environmental organizations in making a case for cross-
media pollution control.279 It has occupied the vanguard in the move
towards environmental integration and, together with other commen-
tators,2"' believes that the objective of integration should be embodied
in new legislation. Pursuant to a cooperative agreement,28 ' the Conser-
vation Foundation has submitted to EPA the final draft of an Environ-
mental Integration and Information Act (Draft Act). 28 2 The Draft Act,
278. Letter from Conservation Foundation to Hank Schilling of EPA (Mar. 13, 1987)
(accompanying the final draft of the Environmental Integration and Reformation Act).
279. See supra note 1. The Conservation Foundation has also drafted an "Environmental
Integration and Information Act" aimed at encouraging program integration, research and moni-
toring, and is presently drafting another more comprehensive "Environmental Protection Act"
which is intended to be an integrated pollution control law. These two draft statutes are research
tools which examine and probe the opportunities and problems of a more integrated approach to
pollution control. Conservative Foundation, News Release (Feb. 10, 1988). A second draft of the
"Environmental Protection Act" (Second Draft) has just become available. Unfortunately, it can-
not be considered in any detail. The Conservation Foundation is also engaged in a third project on
"Integrated Pollution Control in Europe and North America," the purpose of which is to provide
an opportunity for Europeans and North Americans to build a common understanding of the
nature of the cross-media problem. Id.
280. See A. MARCUS, supra note 52, at xv; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PERSPECTIVES
ON TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1977). STABLE FUTURE, supra note
150, at 5 (1984).
281. See Letter, supra note 278.
282. Id. The Draft Act (to be distinguished from the Second Draft referred to in notes 171
and 279) is being treated as a proposal for new legislation and not as a codification of ideas, though
there is some ambivalence about it. The Letter, supra note 278, states that "the goal of the project
was not to draft legislation per se but rather to generate ideas, explore problems, and suggest
solutions." EPA is exploring the extent to which the ideas contained in the integration bill could be
implemented administratively. Id. Despite this assertion, it is clear that the Draft Act is being
presented as prospective legislation. It is difficult to explain why else the Draft Act should propose
to repeal existing legislation and urge the creation of another new statutory body (the National
Commission on Environmental Strategy) in section 801 of the Draft Act. Furthermore, the obliga-
tion to carry out cross-media pollution control is set out in new provisions, and are not derived
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and the ideas embodied in it, are important and merit scrutiny for a
number of reasons. To begin with, the Draft Act represents the distilled
conclusions of an organization which, more than any other, has la-
bored to advance the concept of cross-media pollution. Secondly, it has
attracted the serious attention of EPA and consequently could point to
new directions in environmental thinking. Finally, it may actually form
the basis for new legislation if the reasoning adopted by it gains
currency.
Although there is an unquestionable need for integrating norms
that will countervail the effect of the existing norms of fragmentation,
the quest of the Conservation Foundation for new legislation is miscon-
ceived and futile. It is futile because the difficulties in the way of new
legislation are almost insurmountable. It is misconceived because coun-
tervailing norms are to be found in existing legislation.
1. NEW LEGISLATION
The difficulties in enacting new legislation are truly formidable.28 3
Interest groups seeking legislation need to have access either to the ex-
ecutive or to subcommittees. While lawmaking and policymaking may
no longer be confined to closed networks or "iron triangles" between
congressional subcommittees, executive agencies and outside clientele
groups, the difficulties of breaking into the system are formidable. A bill
needs a sponsor, and getting sponsorship for the Draft Act can be prob-
lematic 28 4 as congressmen and senators hear a bewildering array of
lobbyists and face a confusion of voices.285 Even where a sponsor is
found, the conservatism and caution of the legislature makes progress
very problematic. Congress is ".... devoted inordinately to the preven-
tion of action [and is]... so well equipped to stop legislation. ... ,,281
And what it does not stop, it alters. Compromise is the order of the day.
from existing legislation. Id.; Draft Act § 401(a) & (b). In fact, the Draft Act clearly aspires to be
more than a statement of ideas. This is further borne out by the Conservation Foundation's strong
aversion to the complexity of existing law. They assert that "the environmental statutes have be-
come so detailed and complex that neither Congress nor EPA any longer understands what the
total approach to environmental protection is." Letter, supra note 278, at 2.
283. W. KEEM & M. OGUL, supra note 231, at 1-36; D. LOCKARD, THE PERVERTED PRIORI-
TIES OF AMERICAN POLITICs 123-67 (1971); W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRiCKEY, LEGISLATION 1-36 (1987).
See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
284. One State Department liaison officer is said to have observed that "It used to be that
all one had to do was to contact the chairman and a few ranking members of a committee, now all
435 members and 100 senators have to be contacted." Davidson, supra note 97, at 130 (citing D.
Mulhollan & A. Stevens, Congressional Liaison and the Rise of Informal Groups in Congress
(1979) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 1979 annual meeting of the Western Political
Science Association).
285. Id. at 128-31.
286. D. LocKARD, supra note 283, at 123.
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Any proposal for legislation requires major and marginal compromise
in caucus, in committee, on the floor, and in negotiations with the
executive.28 7
Subcommittees are the leading initiators and drafters of legislative
measures and reports; thus if the Draft Act is to succeed, it needs to
emanate from a subcommittee. 288 There are to date, at least thirty sub-
committees exercising jurisdiction over environmental statutes.28 9 Sub-
committee power extends beyond drafting initial legislation and em-
braces amendments. Consequently, bills are drafted in a manner that
calls for referral to specific committees and subcommittees.
Any legislation seeking overall integration is bound to fail as it
runs the gauntlet of the committee system. Because it will impinge on
the territories of at least thirty committees, a bill based on the Draft Act
cannot succeed. Such an integration bill may be referred to a hostile
committee and quietly pigeonholed, or it may never be placed on a
committee agenda because of the chairperson's opposition. Or, having
passed through a standing committee, the bill may fail to win clearance
from the rules committee and thereby be lost. Even if placed on the
calendar, it may never be called for consideration. Finally, it may be
killed by recommitting it to committee for further study or emasculated
by an amendment which alters its purposes. 2 90 The history surround-
ing both NEPA and EPA only reaffirms the high likelihood of failure.
Even if the Conservation Foundation's proposals go forward in their
present form, there is every possibility that they will emerge out of the
legislative process in unrecognizable form.2 9 1 Moreover, there is the
danger of stirring up a hornets nest of opposition to integration within
Congress. Given the importance of subcommittee jurisdiction and
power, attempts at new legislation may succeed only in aborting any
move to implement integration through the administrative process.
Any effort to introduce new legislation is therefore misconceived.
2. COUNTERVAILING NORMS
A move to introduce fresh legislation needs to be examined from
another perspective. The Conservation Foundation has quite justifiably
complained about the byzantine complexity and uncertainty of the ex-
isting statutory maze. This complexity phenomenon is not a new one,
and, in fact, is endemic to any corpus of law dealing with a complex
287. W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, supra note 231, at 15-16.
288. Davidson, supra note 97, at 114.
289. Kenski & Kenski, Congress Against the President: The Struggle Over the Environ-
ment, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s, supra note 277, at I 1.
290. W. KEEF & M. OGUL, supra note 231, at 6.
291. W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 283, at 237.
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subject.2 9 2 The settled path of reform lies in ascertaining the defects of
the existing system before prescribing what should be. Jurisprudential
lineage to such a line of thinking can be traced to Jeremy Bentham, who
pointed out that before the law could be reformed by legislation, the
nature and shortcomings of the existing law needed to be described and
identified. Before legislation is attempted, therefore, it is customary to
grapple with the complexities of the existing law to determine just what
its defects might be.2 9 3 To rush to legislation, without first discovering
the relevant attributes of existing law, may prove to be a fruitless
pursuit.294
The heart of the Draft Act's objective lies in a two-sided provision.
One side states that the regulating agency shall consider all significant
health and environmental effects of its actions, especially if such effects
may affect the ability of other agencies to fulfill their goals. The other
side states that no action shall be taken by the agency to control one
type of environmental hazard if such action is likely to lead to more
than offsetting damage from cross-media transfers.2 95 The controlling
impact of this provision is offset by a different section which provides
that no action taken by the agency should delay the deadlines estab-
lished in any statute.
2 9 6
292. A committee consisting of the most eminent and illustrious lawyers of the day was
set up to address precisely this issue in 1923. In their first report, which recommended the creation
of an American Law Institute (ALI) which could respond to this challenge, they stated: "Two chief
defects in American Law are its uncertainty and its complexity. These defects cause useless litiga-
tion ... and when litigation is begun, create delay and expense." Proceedings, I A.L.I. 6 (1923).
These difficulties were typically experienced in the common law, but they also arose out of "con-
flicting and badly drawn statutory provisions." The problems encountered in statute law were
enumerated to include lack of clarity in language, lack of agreement or clear statement of princi-
ples, doubts as to whether prior statutes are repealed, collateral applications of specific provisions,
and the possible application of the provisions of the statute to conditions wholly apart from those
which gave rise to the demand for legislation. Id. at 69. While the ALI, in general, rejected new
codification as a solution to the problem, preferring instead "restatements" of the law, they did
prepare a draft code to resolve some of the complexities arising out of tax laws. See ALI, Federal
Income, Estate and Gift Tax Statute (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1954); see also Goodrich, The Story of the
American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 283 (1951). Such restatements and draft statutes are
based upon the fundamental premise that law as it "is" should be determined before proceeding to
what the law "ought" to be.
293. Bentham called the description of the legal system as it is, "expository" jurispru-
dence, and the criticism of the law in terms of its ends, "censorial" jurisprudence or the "art of
legislation." H. HART & J. BURNS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 293-95 (1970).
294. Duplication and re-enactment of existing concepts could well be the final result. Cu-
riously, the Conservation Foundation has not even made a preliminary examination of the ex-
isting statutory regime.
295. See supra note 278 (Draft Act § 401(a), (b)).
296. Id. (Draft Act § 401(d)). The Administrator of EPA is further authorized to approve
up to 10 demonstration projects to show the advantages of taking a more integrated approach to
dealing with environmental problems and to test methods for implementing more integrated ap-
proaches. He or she is authorized to exempt these demonstration projects from all or any parts of
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B. Integration Through Existing Legislation
The Conservation Foundation's proposal to use integrating goals
to counter the sectoral and single medium goals of existing legislation
has substantial merit. The argument of this'paper is that such goals can
be reached through existing legislation. The rightful call in this situa-
tion is for an exhaustive and definitive analysis of every statutory provi-
sion dealing with pollution control to ascertain if any of these permit or
authorize integration. It would then be necessary to ascertain the extent
to which these provisions could be woven together to form a pattern of
law, policy and administration supporting an integrated approach.
Such an endeavor is beyond the scope of this Article. As an example,
however, this Article will present a preliminary analysis arising from a
synoptic view of the existing statutory regimes by dealing with the con-
trol of chemicals, which present the greatest contemporary danger. 29 7
An aerial view of the present statutory landscape spanning chemicals
offers one good example of a statute, the Toxic Substances Control Act
of 1976 (TSCA), that takes an integrated approach. There are, of
course, other statutes dealing with the control of toxic substances,29 8
but TSCA is being chosen for analysis because of its special attrib-
utes.299 When meshed with the integrating principles already institu-
tionalized by NEPA and EPA, TSCA presents a viable baseline from
which to move towards the administrative implementation of an inte-
grated approach. Even provisions of statutes such as the Clean Air Act
could be telescoped into TSCA and, consequently, strengthen an inte-
grated approach. An eagle's view of the broad sweep of statutes should
be the prelude to a painstaking 'fly's eye' scrutiny of all relevant stat-
utes. What is now being attempted represents no more than a first step
towards such a comprehensive analysis.
any statute. Id. (Draft Act § 402(e)). The Draft Act also contemplates repealing a cluster of provi-
sions in existing pollution legislation dealing with research and grants for research. Id. (Draft Act
§ 605). Finally, it contemplates the setting up of a National Commission on Environmental Strat-
egy, a sunset commission, with a lifetime of no more than three years, to draw up a unified national
strategic environmental plan. Id. (Draft Act § 801).
297. COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 275, at 12-13; B. RABE, supra
note 1, at 3-22, 143-62.
298. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972, Pub. L. No .92-
516, 86 Stat. 973, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i
(1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982); Clean Air Act, § 112,42 U.S.C. 7412 (1982); Clean Water Act § 307, 33
U.S.C. § 1317 (1982).
299. See infra notes 300-51 and accompanying text.
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1. THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT OF 1976300
In 1971, President Nixon submitted to Congress a bill which
sought to integrate the ways in which toxic substances were controlled.
CEQ, which had researched and drafted the bill, set out their reasoning
and conclusions in an influential report on toxic substances.301 The re-
port argued that most toxic substances do not exclusively pollute air or
water, they are found in varying quantities in air, water, soil, food and
industrial and consumer products. The multiplicity of ways by which
society is exposed to toxics makes it difficult for the media-oriented au-
thorities to consider the total exposure of an individual to a given sub-
stance, a consideration necessary for the establishment of adequate en-
vironmental standards. In terms of human health, the total exposure of
a human being to a given substance from all parts of environment-air,
water and food-must be considered. Furthermore, the interaction of
these substances both within and outside the body must be evaluated.
Similar consideration must be given to other living organisms. Since no
agency had considered itself completely responsible for all such sub-
stances in all media, CEQ recommended that a new legal authority,
EPA, should take over that function.30 2
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) was passed in 1976. Its
passage was marked by disagreements between the House and Sen-
ate.3 °3 What is important for the purposes of this Article is that the
disagreement between House and Senate did not turn on the need for or
relevance of integration; that seemed to be a given.30 4 In fact, on the
key provisions broadly defining the "environment, ' 3 5 there was no
disagreement.30 6 Nor were there any significant differences on the need
for the collection of information that would reveal the total exposure to
a chemical and would monitor its total effect on health and environ-
300. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1982) [hereinafter TSCA].
301. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES (1971).
302. Id. at v-vi.
303. H.R. REP. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8 (1976). See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL
ACT (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; R. DRULEY & G. ORDWAY, THE
Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 9-26 (1981); Gaynor, The Toxic Substances Control Act:A Regu-
latory Morass 30 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1149-52 (1977); R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 445 (2d ed. 1985).
304. The Senate favored a restrictive approach to the marketing of chemicals based upon
preregistration similar to that contained in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act. The House desired that all new chemicals be marketed without notification or registration,
unless the EPA administrator had already placed such new chemicals on a "black list." The com-
promise eventually reflected in TSCA rejects a rigid preregistration regulatory scheme found in
pesticide and drug laws, and favors a system of notice and selective interdiction. See W. RODGERS,
supra note 5, at 898-901.
305. TSCA, § 3(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2602(5) (1982).
306. R. DRULEY & G. ORDWAY, supra note 303, at 9-25.
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ment. 30 ' There was also agreement on the critical provisions (of section
9) dealing with the relationship of TSCA to other laws.
The TSCA has three objectives.308 One objective is to prevent un-
reasonable risks of injury to health or the environment and to take ac-
tion on imminent hazards from the specified chemicals30 9 without un-
duly impeding technological innovation.3 1 ° It could be argued that the
concern over unreasonable risk is negated by the requirement for re-
straint in regulating such chemicals, thus emasculating the act and ren-
dering it ineffective. Even if this is true, the import of the act in estab-
lishing an integrated approach to pollution control is very substantial.
The second objective of TSCA is to have the industry in question
test chemical substances-where there is insufficient data to determine
their effects-if the administrator finds that (1) they may present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, (2) they will
be produced in substantial quantities and enter the environment in sub-
stantial quantities, or (3) they will be produced in substantial quantities
and result in significant or substantial human exposure. The purpose of
the testing is to determine whether the manufacture, distribution in
commerce, processing, use, or disposal of the substance presents an un-
reasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. 311 The third
objective TSCA required was the establishment of an Interagency Test-
ing Committee, 312 to screen chemicals for potential "significant risk of
serious and widespread harm" and to recommend a list of chemicals
that should be tested further. TSCA defines the term "environment" to
include "water, air, land and the interrelationship which exists among
and between water, air and land and all living things." 313 Manufactur-
ers are required to give notice to the administrator of EPA before man-
ufacturing a new chemical substance or putting an old substance to a
significant new use. 314 TSCA also empowers the administrator to delay
or restrict the manufacture of a new chemical,315 to adopt rules to pro-
hibit manufacture and processing, 316 and to obtain injunctive relief.31 7
TSCA has institutionalized an integrated approach to the control
of chemicals. It embraces the entire environment, together with total
307. Id.
308. TSCA, § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1982).
309. Id. §§ 5(f), 6, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(f), 2605, 2606.
310. Id. § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
311. Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
312. Id. § 4(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(e). The members of the Committee came from the princi-
pal federal agencies having statutory obligations with respect to chemical health risks: the Na-
tional Institute of Health, the National Cancer Institute, and National Science Foundation.
313. TSCA, § 3(5), 15 U.S.C. § 2602(5) (1982).
314. Id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604.
315. Id. § 5(e)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(I)(A).
316. Id. § 5(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f)(3)(A).
317. Id. § 5(f)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f)(3)(B).
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human exposure, and is not confined to the usual divisions between air,
land and water, or to particular routes of exposure. Integration is crys-
tallized by section 9 of TSCA, dealing with the act's relationship to
other laws. When available information leads to the conclusion that
there is an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment
from an activity not controlled by other federal laws, section 9 autho-
rizes the administrator to require other agencies to help abate the activ-
ity in question.3"'
Even more significant is the provision of section 9319 dealing with
laws administered by EPA. It provides:
The Administrator shall coordinate actions taken under this
chapter with actions taken under other Federal laws.... If the
Administrator determines that a risk to health or the environ-
ment... could be eliminated or reduced to a sufficient extent
by actions taken under the authorities contained in such other
Federal laws, the Administrator shall use such authorities to
protect against such risk unless the Administrator determines,
in the Administrator's discretion, that it is in the public inter-
est to protect against such risk by actions under this
chapter .... 320
The section commands the administrator to coordinate an integrated
approach to pollution control established by TSCA With the segmented
approaches of the other legislation. The administrator is instructed to
consider whether the powers granted under those other acts could be
used to control the risks defined in TSCA. If they can, the existing body
of pollution control legislation, insofar as it concerned chemicals,
would need to be interpreted in the light of the integrating and holistic
policies embodied in TSCA. Because the section stipulates that the ad-
ministrator shall use the powers under those acts rather than TSCA, the
case for a reinterpretation of existing legislation is considerably
strengthened. In sum, TSCA institutionalizes a countervailing norm of
integration. Many of the provisions of apparently single medium stat-
utes can now be interpreted from a different perspective. In the light of
TSCA's provisions, it would be very difficult to ignore the applicability
of an integrated approach to pollution control in the administration of
other legislation.
318. Id. § 9(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2608(a)(1).




2. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
In order to execute TSCA's mandate that the Administrator of
EPA determine if the "authorities" or powers contained in other laws
could be used to further an integrated approach to the control of chemi-
cals, it is necessary to find out if any of those powers could be used in
this way. TSCA refers only to chemicals, but chemicals reach into every
medium and constitute the greatest threat to the environment today.
Chemicals include conventional pollutants321 as well as hazardous sub-
stances that, even at relatively low levels, present risks to human health.
When non-integrated protective action against chemicals is taken in
one medium, such as air, risks can be transferred to other media.322
TSCA addresses this problem, and the way in Which the integrating
principles embodied in TSCA could drive other legislation is illustrated
by the Clean Air Act.
In controlling air pollution, the Clean Air Act draws a distinction
between conventional or "criteria" pollutants for which national ambi-
ent air quality standards are to be set,323 and the more dangerous "haz-
ardous" pollutants that could cause serious harm even in small quanti-
ties. Emission and performance standards are to be set for these
"hazardous" pollutants. 324 The provisions of the Clean Air Act appli-
cable to hazardous chemicals have been excruciatingly difficult to ad-
minister. 325 This analysis will consider how chemicals may be dealt
with under the less onerous provisions dealing with "criteria"
pollutants.
I Section 4 of TSCA, which triggers the rest of the act, applies to
chemical substances in two different situations. The first of these occurs
where there is an "unreasonable risk of injury to health and the envi-
ronment.",326 The other arises when a chemical substance is produced
in substantial quantities and may reasonably be anticipated to enter the
environment in substantial quantities or cause significant or substantial
321. "Criteria" pollutants under the Clean Air Act such as sulfur dioxide, particulate
matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons and nitrogen dioxide are exam-
ples of conventional pollutants.
322. COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 275, at 12-13.
323. Clean Air Act, §§ 108, 109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409 (1982).
324. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412. In contrast to the primary ambient air quality standards
for "criteria" pollutants, which are established at levels that provide an "adequate" margin of
safety to protect the public health, the emission levels for hazardous pollutants provide for an
"ample" margin of safety.
325. Section 1 12(b)(l)(B) of the Clean Air Act stipulates that emission standards should
be prescribed within 180 days of the publication of the list of hazardous pollutants. Clean Air Act,
§ 11 2(b)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(I)(B) (1982). EPA has not found it possible to do so. Moreover,
it is arguable that an "ample margin" of safety when dealing with hazardous chemicals is tanta-
mount to zero emissions, effectuating a closedown of sources of pollution. EPA has been unwilling
to do this. J. TOPPING & A. HELM, CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK 76-90 (1987).
326. TSCA, § 4(a)(l)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(l)(A) (1982).
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human exposure to such substances. 27 The rationale for this distinc-
tion seems to be that a danger from chemical substances could arise
from small quantities of highly dangerous chemicals or large quantities
of less dangerous substances. As we have seen, section 9 of TSCA refers
to "a risk to health or the environment associated with a chemical sub-
stance or mixture." Section 9 seems to stipulate that where the Admin-
istrator determines the presence of a risk which does not amount to an
"unreasonable" one, and such substance "could be eliminated or re-
duced to a sufficient extent.. ." by powers under other federal laws, the
administrator should as a rule use such laws to control that risk. While
the interdiction of unreasonable risk would proceed under the more
stringent provisions of TSCA, ordinary risk which could be reduced to
a "sufficient" extent under a different statute should be dealt with under
that other statute.328 Accordingly, the hazardous substances causing
"unreasonable" risk referred to under section 4 of TSCA would not be
subject to control under other laws, while the less dangerous substances
giving rise to ordinary risk would be so controlled.
The Clean Air Act controls air pollutants resulting from diverse
mobile or stationary sources "that may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."' 32 9 This closely resembles the risk
from "substantial human exposure" 330 and the "risk to health or the
environment, 331 from chemicals referred to by TSCA, and is the kind
of situation governed by section 9 of TSCA. Where it is determined that
section 9 applies, the provisions of the Clean Air Act do lend themselves
to an integrated approach.
In controlling criteria pollutants, the Clean Air Act retains the
concept of an "atmospheric area" introduced by the Air Quality Act of
1967.332 Within these areas, air quality regions 333 have been estab-
lished. The relationship of environmental quality to a cross-media ap-
proach is quite significant. When dealing with generalized pollution
(i.e., pollution which cannot be attributed to just one source of air pol-
lution), air quality objectives can only be achieved after controlling pol-
lution from all sources and pathways. If sewerage works and landfills
are sources of pollution, they would need to be assessed in addition to
327. Id. § 4(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i).
328. Section 9 provides the administrator with extraordinary power to deal with such a
case under TSCA itself, but he would need to justify such a course of action as being in the public
interest. Id. § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 2608.
329. Clean Air Act, § 108(a)(l)(A) & (B), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(I)(A) & (B) (1982). Welfare
is defined as including effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wild-
life, weather, visibility and climate. Id. § 301(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1982).
330. TSCA, § 4(a)(I)(B), 15 U.S.C. §2603(a)(l)(B)(i)(1982).
331. Id. § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2608(b).
332. Clean Air Act, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1982). There are 10 atmospheric areas.
333. Id. § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7407(e). There are 247 such regions.
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direct emissions into the atmosphere. Conceptually, environmental
quality objectives call for a consideration of all possible sources of air
pollution which may affect the objectives in question. Having arrived at
the point where all sources and pathways of a pollutant become rele-
vant, it is not difficult to move onto the next step of considering the
impact and distribution of pollutants from a given source. The Clean
Air Act makes it possible to do just this.
An integrated approach is reinforced by other provisions of the
Clean Air Act. Human health is, of course, affected by more than air
pollution. A cross-media approach is almost a necessary corollary to
any satisfactory regime for the protection of human health. Harm to
human health can be caused in three ways: inhalation, ingestion
through food or water, and absorption through the skin. While the reg-
ulation of air emissions may control ill health caused by inhalation, it is
possible that a pollutant could still reach its human target through its
presence in water. Polluted water, for example, could be used for drink-
ing, bathing or washing, and fish which had absorbed the pollutant
could be eaten, leading to the bio-accumulation of the pollutant in
humans.
Numerous provisions of the Clean Air Act dealing with air quality
criteria and control techniques are open to integrating interconnec-
tions. Section 108(a)(2) requires that air quality criteria shall draw at-
tention to "all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may
be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air...."
The air quality criteria issued by the administrator under TSCA are to
include information about variables and other pollutants which, of
themselves or in combination with others, may produce adverse effects
on public health or welfare.334 The information the administrator is to
provide shall include data about environmental impacts of emission
control technology 3. 5 and shall state how processes or procedures for
reducing criteria pollutants may increase the emission or formation of
other pollutants.3 36 The present sparse list of six criteria pollutants
could to be expanded on the basis of a cross-media evaluation. The fact
that section 108 of the Clean Air Act sets out an uncompromising, even
absolutist, demand that human health should be protected at any
cost,337 should not be allowed to avert the wider application of the
Clean Air Act. Arguments about the wisdom of such standards or the
need to take account of technological and economic considerations
334. Id. § 108(a)(2)(A)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1982).
335. Id. § 108(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b)(1).
336. Id. § 108(f)(I)(D), 42 U.S.C § 7408(f)(I)(D).
337. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-56 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980); American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1190 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982).
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should be addressed to Congress. In any event, the measures contem-
plated by the Clean Air Act, when dealing with criteria pollutants, are
substantially less stringent than those contemplated under TSCA.
The Clean Air Act's state implementation plans (SIPs) provide for
the "implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of both primary
and secondary ambient standards.33 It is, of course, vital that these
SIPs should also adopt a cross-media approach, and sections
1 1O(a)(2)(A) and (B) of the act enable this to be done. These sections
state that the administrator shall approve such a plan if it provides for
the attainment of primary and secondary ambient air quality stan-
dards339 and if "it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timeta-
bles for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as
may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such pri-
mary or secondary standard .. ."340 These provisions dovetail into
others dealing with new and existing stationary sources of pollution.341
In setting standards for them, the administrator is obliged to take into
consideration "any nonair quality health and environmental impact
and energy requirements."
342
TSCA drives the implementation of pollution legislation in other
ways. We have seen that section 9 compels the administrator of EPA to
coordinate actions under TSCA with actions under other laws. This
means that, for example, the control of hazardous pollutants under the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act would need to be coordinated with
TSCA. At present, there is little coordination between the setting of
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants343 and discharge stan-
dards for hazardous water pollutants 344 and even less coordination be-
tween the three statutes.
The opportunities for integration are made more promising by an-
other development. As noted in Part II, EPA resisted the application of
NEPA to its own regulatory activities, and EPA was exempted from
complying with the more exacting conditions of NEPA because the
Clean Air Act demanded the "functional equivalent" of a NEPA im-
pact assessment. In holding that EPA should undertake the functional
,equivalent of a NEPA impact assessment when setting standards for
new sources under section 111 of the Clean Air Act, the court of appeals
in Portland Cement opened the door to similar interpretations not only
of other provisions of the Clean Air Act, but also of all other acts ad-
338. Clean Air Act, § I 10(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1982).
339. Id. § I l0(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1982).
340. Id. § I I0(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(B) (1982).
341. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1982).
342. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(l) (1982).
343. Id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
344. Clean Water Act, § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982).
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ministered by EPA. The decision certainly was a factor behind EPA's
decision to take what has been described as the "giant practical
step ' 3 45 of issuing a policy statement declaring that it would voluntar-
ily prepare environmental impact statements in connection with certain
major regulatory activities. 34 ' There apparently were other reasons
that led to this decision. The question whether EPA should be bound by
NEPA had already been examined by an internal EPA task force
3 4 7
that had recognized that at least one part of the rationale for EPA's
creation was to promote a coordinated, multi-faceted approach to the
solution of environmental problems. 348 This internal recognition of the
need to undertake wide environmental assessment made it difficult for
EPA to insist that it lacked integrative functions. Further, EPA had
been urged by the House to prepare impact assessments, 3 49 and, $5
million was appropriated to EPA for the preparation of environmental
impact statements.350 Up until now, the majority of EPA's voluntary
preparation of impact statements has been restricted to treatment plant
construction grants and Clean Water Act section 208 area-wide plan-
ning grants,3 51 but there is no reason why it should be so restricted. The
preparation of impact analysis prior to its regulatory activities dealing
with chemicals would indeed constitute a major step towards the inte-
gration envisioned by TSCA.
C. Possible Constraints
A further concomitant of an integrated approach is the reliance
placed on the expertise of administrators. Decisions as to how integra-
tion should be achieved in the particular circumstances of a case cannot
be dictated in advance. To the extent that integration does not lend
itself to specific legislative prescription, it calls for a renewal and reaffir-
mation of belief in New Deal expertise. This does present the danger of
a possible recurrence of those problems which led to the eschewing of
345. Comment, Coordinating the EPA, NEPA, and the Clean Air Act, 52 TEX. L. REv.
527, 529 (1974).
346. 39 Fed. Reg. 16,186-87 (1974).
347. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 63.
348. The task force noted, however, that some statutory mandates may prevent EPA
from undertaking the wider investigation demanded by NEPA. Id. at 46. It also drew attention to
major unanswerable questions about the scope of impact statements under NEPA to which EPA
might be subject. The questions included the extent to which EPA should consider effects not
commanded by or inconsistent with specific statutory mandates; whether a broad scale cost-benefit
analysis is permissible or required; whether a final statement should be issued prior to proposing
regulations. Id. at 48.
349. H.R. REP. No. 520, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 18-19 (1973).
350. Agriculture- Environmental and Consumer Appropriation Act, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-135, 87 Stat. 468, 482 (1973).
351. J. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL-DEcISIONMAKING AND NEPA 113 (1986).
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expertise.3 52 It will be argued that there is little possibility of "capture"
where there are vigilant "watchdog" groups. Environmental groups
manifest their presence, and their impact is felt in no uncertain terms,
thereby making agency surrender to industry quite unlikely. Moreover,
reasonable safeguards against administrative malaise can be provided.
Finally, the risks of maladministration are justified by the benefits of an
integrated system as against a fragmented one. Furthermore, it might
be argued that the countervailing goal presented by TSCA will only
confuse EPA, as the agency will be torn between the competing pres-
sures of differing goals. Competing pressures, however, are among the
normal problems facing administrators. The traditional model of ad-
ministrative law which conceives of the agency as a mere transmission
belt for implementing specific and defined legislative directives often
mocks reality. Instead, statutes create broad and indefinite goals, while
granting agencies wide discretion to implement those inchoate goals. In
carrying out their legislative mandate, the agencies are constrained to
act as surrogate legislatures and adopt procedures designed to reconcile
the competing goals of legislation and adjust the claims of those af-
fected by those goals.15 3 This view of the administrative process was
developed by political scientists and is now widely shared by judges,
legislators, practitioners and legal commentators.3 54 In some cases, the
goals mentioned in the law merely comprised a "laundry list" that
leaves gaping uncertainties concerning the mission of the program. 5
In others, the multiplicity of goals may render more than one of them
incapable of fulfillment.3 56
EPA should choose to implement the clear integrating norms em-
bodied in existing legislation such as TSCA and NEPA.357 In order to
do so, EPA would need to establish rules that detail the manner in
352. See supra text accompanying notes 75-89. The views advanced in this Article draw
support from J. WILSON (see supra notes 74 and 104) and Sabatier, Social Movements and Regula-
tory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate-and Less Pessimistic-Theory of "Clientele Capture," 6
POL'Y Sc. 301 (1975).
353. Stewart, supra note 179, at 1671-88; A. BONFIELD, supra note 212, at 8-10.
354. Stewart, supra note 179, at 1683 n.64.
355. F. THOMPSON, HEALTH POLICY AND THE BUREAUCRACY: POLITICS AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION 47-48 (1981).
356.- R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW AND PROCESS 44-45
(1985) (describing the telling example of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, which required
the president to promulgate a regulation for the mandatory allocation of petroleum products
which was to protect the publichealth, maintain public services and agricultural operations, pre-
serve a sound and competitive petroleum industry, allocate crude oil to refiners to permit them to
operate at full capacity, result in an equitable distribution of supplies to all parts of the country,
promote economic efficiency, and minimize economic distortion). The regulation was codified at
15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1) (1982).
357. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Integrating norms are being treated as
public-regarding norms. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. Ray. 223, 250-51 (1986).
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which the agency would resolve the pulls of differing goals and compet-
ing claims in its move towards integration. This is clearly a "political"
process,35" and there is a danger that EPA in responding to interest
group politics, as well as to the currents of thinking leading to the adop-
tion of a fragmented approach,3 59 will be steered away from integra-
tion. Both practical and theoretical considerations suggest otherwise.
At a practical level, environmental interest groups are not gener-
ally motivated by incremental thinking to the degree evident in the late
1960s and early 1970s. This is borne out by EPA's striking move
towards integration in the early 1980s, when it adopted the consoli-
dated permit regulations, which it was hoped would synthesize the sep-
arate single-medium permit systems to provide a more comprehensive
environmental evaluation of industrial projects. 360 The regulations
were an initiative of the Carter Administration aimed at governing the
hazardous waste management program under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act, 361 the Underground Injection Control pro-
gram of the Safe Drinking Water Act,3 6 2 the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System, and State Dredge or Fill programs under
the Clean Water Act,3 63 and the Prevention of Significant Deteriora-
tion program under the Clean Air Act. 364 The consolidated regulations
were clearly integrating 365 in intent. Several environmentalist and in-
dustry petitioners challenged these regulations in court,3 6 6 but the en-
vironmentalist groups did not challenge the need for a comprehensive
approach. The main challenge to the regulations came from industry
groups that claimed that the regulations imposed additional
burdens.3 67
358. A. BONFIELD, supra note 212, at 8-9.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 51-147.
360. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (1980). C. Sellers, in The Rise and Fall of the Consolidated
Permit Program-A Case Study of a Reform Effort Within the EPA 9-11 (unpublished paper
submitted to Conservation Foundation Aug. 14, 1984), argues that the Consolidated Permit Pro-
gram foundered because the original environmental objective of integrating all phases of air, water
and solid waste cycles was lost in the effort to justify the program on efficiency and paper reduction
grounds.
361. Renamed as the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 i (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
362. Renamed as the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(0-3000)(11) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
363. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
364. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
365. The most important environmental benefit was listed as the "more comprehensive
management and control of wastes." 45 Fed. Reg. 33,291 (1980).
366. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See
C. Sellers, supra note 360.
367. Under the Reagan Administration, the regulations were "de-consolidated" (effec-
tively repealed) in response to the President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief. 13 Envtl. Rep.
2205 (BNA) (1983).
Integrating Thoughtways
Even if interest groups behave differently and exert pressure on
EPA to desist from integrating policies, it is submitted that EPA is enti-
tled to resist such pressures. It is the EPA's duty to interpret and exe-
cute the goals embodied in legislation, in what it considers to be the best
public interest. A "republican" theory of government36 and a "public
interest" or Weberian model of administration36 9 offer strong theoreti-
cal justification for the view that Congress mandates and empowers the
agency to determine what constitutes the public interest and public
good. It is the responsibility of the legislature to reconcile competing
groups and render clashing interests subservient to the public good.3 7 °
Where this has been done and legislative goals are clear, the poli-
cymaker must promote only those goals specified by the politically re-
sponsible legislature. 371 Where they are not clear, or there are compet-
ing goals, the agency takes on the mantle of a surrogate legislature. The
agency's task, however, is not to mediate in a struggle between self-
interested groups who impress their preferences on the agency, but
rather to determine the public interest and the public good. It is envi-
sioned that the private interests of the citizens and interest groups will
be subordinated to the public good, 37 2 as determined by the agency.
A "republican" view of government and a "public interest" model
of administration are supported by evidence of a general movement
from incrementalism to comprehensive rationality. It is a movement
that represents an historical and logical progression of ideas and insti-
tutions. We have taken note of Lindblom's criticism of the rational
model of decision making.373 Lindblom's alternative of an incremental
approach is open to criticism on a number of grounds. It is premised on
the view that the results of present policies must, on the whole, be satis-
factory.374 If the present policies are manifestly inadequate or wrong, it
would be folly to persist in variations of them. Furthermore, incre-
mentalist strategy almost by definition does not apply to fundamental
368. D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 93-99 (1984); Bessette, Delib-
erative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE
CONSTITUTION? 102 (R. Goldwin & W. Schabbra eds. 1980). Sunstein, supra note 219; Reich, supra
note 219.
369. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judi-
cial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149 (1977-1978); Mashaw, Mirrored
Ambivalence: A Sometimes Curmudgeonly Comment on the Relationship Between Organization
Theory and Administrative Law, 33 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 24, 29 (1983).
370. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (S. Mittell ed. 1938).
371. Diver, supra note 215, at 398-99.
372. Sunstein, supra note 219, at 31. This view also draws support from Macey, who
maintains that courts should construe statutes according to their public-regarding goals and prin-
ciples. Macey, supra note 357, at 250-56. On a parity of reasoning, agencies should act likewise.
373. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
374. Dror, Governmental Decision Making: Muddling Through- "Science" or Inertia?, 24
PuB. ADMIN. REV. 153, 154 (1964).
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decisions, 7 5 and fundamental decisions set the context and lay the
foundations for incremental decisions.3 76 Incremental decisions may
lead to and follow upon fundamental decisions but cannot be under-
stood without them. Decisionmaking, therefore, is a dynamic consist-
ing of some fundamental decisions and a number of incremental deci-
sions which modify, build upon and/or alter those fundamental
decisions. To arrive at such fundamental decisions, however, it is neces-
sary to step outside the incremental model in order to gain a wider con-
ceptual horizon. The move towards an integrated strategy is being ad-
vocated as a fundamental decision which can substantially alter the
whole course of environmental policy. It has been argued cogently that
incremental processes which serve at an early stage of a policy initiative
should, in a number of cases, evolve into a more rational analysis.
"[T]his transformation can best be understood as a movement from an
'incrementalist' model of policymaking to one of 'comprehensive ra-
tionality.' ,,377 The thrust of such a conclusion has been endorsed by
prominent administrative lawyers, both specifically and generally,37
and by political scientists.3 79
It is possible to use an evolutionary model of jurisprudence38 0 and
to view comprehensive rationality as evolving from incrementalism.
Evolutionary theories in jurisprudence are more than merely theories
that the law changes. They are theories contained in a much larger par-
adigm that describes how the world changes and ought to respond in
the face of resource scarcity and natural selection. It is tradition with a
rich jurisprudential lineage that extends from historical jurists like Savi-
gny3 1' and Maine, 38 2 to others like Wigmore and Kocourek, 38 3 to
375. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, supra note 90, at 66-69.
376. Etzioni, Mixed-Scanning: A "Third" Approach to Decision-Making, 27 PUB. ADMIN.
REv. 385, 387 (1967).
377. Diver, supra note 215, at 394-95.
378. Specifically with regard to pollution control, See Rehbinder & Stewart, supra note
271, at 1-13; more generally see A. BONFIELD, supra note 212, at 3-11.
379. E.g., RABE, supra note i, at 156-60.
380. See Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985),
and Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985), for illumi-
nating reviews of the literature dealing with the American tradition of legal evolution. See also P.
STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980), which deals with theories of legal evolu-
tion in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European jurisprudence, and describes the ideas of
jurists such as Bentham, Savigny and Maine. Stein, however, concludes that theories of evolution
were nineteenth-century phenomena and did not survive the end of the century, Id. at 122.
381. FVON SAVIGNY, ON THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRU-
DENCE (A. Hayward trans. London 1831 and Arno Press reprint 1975). Savigny suggests that law is
not the intentional creation of governors, but evolves out of the common spirit of the people.
382. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY
AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (Beacon Ed. 1963). Maine identifies three successive stages in
the evolution of progressive societies.
383. EVOLUTION OF LAW: SELECT READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL
INSTITIONS (J. Wigmore & A. Kocourek eds. 1915-1918) (three volumes). In the third volume,
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pragmatic instrumentalists like Holmes. 8 . and Pound,38 5 and includes
Clark386 and Rodgers.387 It is not proposed, however, to explain the
theoretical underpinnings for a move from incrementalism to integra-
tion in terms of Darwinian or other socio-biological theories of evolu-
tion.3 88 What is being offered is a more practical explanation of incre-
mentalism as a passing stage in the development or evolution of
environmental policies. The winds of change are blowing the present
fragmented policies stranded in incrementalism towards those of inte-
gration based on comprehensive rationality. Rather than view the im-
plementation of cross-media policies as another difficulty, EPA should
see their task as an opportunity for shaping and reforming public val-
ues, and for contributing to the community's understanding of this
problem.389
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen how ecological streams of thinking based on integra-
tion arose at a time of general disillusionment with New Deal idealism.
A suspicion of administrative expertise shaped the environmental per-
spective and resulted in calls for clear, precise and easily followed legis-
lative mandates. Such demands converged with incrementalist models
of administration and resulted in the institutionalization of fragmenta-
titled FoRMArnvE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT, the authors develop a comprehensive the-
ory of legal evolution.
384. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1946). In a celebrated passage, Holmes began:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed.
Id. at 1. As Elliot remarks, Holmes' claim that legal doctrines evolve in response to changes in the
social environment has become virtually a canon of faith for American lawyers. Elliot, supra note
380, at 51.
385. R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS (1924); R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW
(1942). Pound believed that jurisprudence developed historically through three evolutionary
stages. See LAW AND MoRALs, at 29-33.
386. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977); Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J.
1238 (1981).
387. Rodgers, Bringing People Back: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Taking in Natu-
ral Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982).
388. Elliot, for example, considers theories about the nature and sources of law to be
evolutionary if they propose that the law is shaped by its environment in a way that is analogized
explicitly to Darwin's theory of evolution in biology. Elliot, supra note 380, at 39. Darwin sug-
gested that the forms of living things are shaped by environmental conditions and not the design
choices of a creator. But as Hovenkamp points out, jurisprudence was evolutionary long before
Darwin and will continue to be evolutionary. Hovenkamp, supra note 380, at 645.
389. Administrator Ruckelshaus of the EPA faced up to similar challenges. Reich, supra
note 219, at 1632-40.
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tion. The new confluence of fragmented thought swamped even inte-
grating developments, such as NEPA and EPA, and obstructed the im-
plementation of others, such as TSCA. After some remarkable
successes, fragmented policies have resulted in equally conspicuous fail-
ures, and these failures call for a review and re-examination of existing
policies, and demand fresh initiatives. A re-examination of the founda-
tions of environmental thought, law and policy reveals the extent to
which the answers to contemporary problems can be shaped by a redis-
covery of existing integrative norms. Existing integrative norms are ren-
dered even more important in the light of a different convergence of
thoughtways. Incrementalism is giving way to comprehensive rational-
ity, and comprehensive rationality admirably complements the pursuit
of integration. This Article has suggested how the ecological thinking
which gave birth to NEPA, EPA and TSCA could be meshed with com-
prehensive rationality in order to meet the challenge of the 1990s and
the twenty-first century.
The most promising way out of the present impasse is for EPA to
restructure itself along functional lines, abolish its programmatic divi-
sions, and take a fresh look at the statutes it administers. It may be a
difficult undertaking, but it is not anything as exacting as trying to per-
suade Congress to disengage itself from the existing legislation. Signifi-
cantly, Administrator Reilly,39 ° together with many others within
EPA, 39 ' have acknowledged the critical importance of an integrated
approach and the need to change direction. By moving from an incre-
mental, program-based approach to one that is functional and rational,
EPA will be reclaiming its integrating mandate, while simultaneously
rediscovering its ecological roots. Perhaps there may be a happy ending
to the story.
In the face of losses and setbacks, the Great Agency de-
cided to review its earlier position and reconsider the philosophy
underlying its creation. This led to the re-opening of the minds
of many important officers of the Great Agency who soon real-
ized the folly of their ways. They decided to reform the Agency
by breaking down the programmatic barriers which had been the
principal cause of many of its failures, and by implementing for-
gotten mandates. It was no easy task. The walls separating air,
water and land pollution, unlike those of Jericho, did not crum-
390. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
391. Aim, The EPA's Approach to Cross-Media Problems, in NEW PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 1; Schmandt, Managing Comprehensive Rule Making: EPA's Plan for Integrated Environmen-
tal Management, 45 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 309 (1985).
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ble before a trumpet blast, and those within the walls resisted
stubbornly. But the reformers persisted and fiuially prevailed.
Following upon the removal of the walls and the abolition of
single-medium programs, a new strategy of cross-media pollu-
tion control replaced single-medium campaigns. Since then,
there have been dramatic changes in the war against the Hydra.
Its true identity and nature are better understood, and its many
heads are recognized as different manifestations of the same
creature. The Great Agency is able to integrate and coordinate
its attacks against the Hydra, and many battles have been won.
The war still goes on, but the character and weaknesses of the
Hydra are understood, and a better organized and equipped
Great Agency is confident of the final outcome.'

